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ABSTRACT 
The thesis deals with the relationship between 
motives, reasons and action. The thesis through a review 
of literature on the topic is an attempt to understand and 
present an assessment of the possible complex 
problematic of motives, reasons and action. This attempt is 
also to locate link and connection, if any, amongst them. 
The thesis attempts to bring together the scattered 
literature on motives, reasons and action into a complex 
whole to enable a better understanding and therefore to 
tackle the relationship which may lead us to some 
clarification of how the term 'action' may be employed. 
The thesis introduces its theme on the mind body 
axis. Some philosophers have argued, contrary to the 
normal percept, that action is only a happening or an 
event. In contrast with these philosophers, action is 
understood to be a bodily movement characterized with 
some distinguishing features compelling the label 'action'. 
It is the distinction, which Wittgenstein candidly draws 
when he talks of the 'my arm rising' and 'raising my arm'. It 
may be admitted that in both the cases the same muscles 
are involved. Bodily movement may be classified as 
voluntary and involuntary. Former is performed with 
purpose, aim, goal, target, etc. while the latter does not 
involve aim, goal or target. However, it is argued that 
whenever an action is performed by an agent his motives, 
desires, intentions or reasons are involved as such. 
The word 'desire' is usually understood differently 
from 'motive'. The term 'desire' has the connotations of 
appetite, sex etc. where 'motive' normally stretches beyond 
these connotations. Another term which is intimately 
connected with the term 'motive' is ' intention'. Motive 
sometimes appears as part of intention and sometimes as 
an interchangeable term. But intention may be 
distinguished from 'motive', for the latter appears to be the 
executive part. In short, it can be said that 'motive' is the 
executive aspect of intention resulting in action. 
In an analysis of the relation between 'motive' and 
'action' the term 'reason' is of special interest, for it 
appears to explain action. It is thus justif ied to ask for the 
'reason' behind doing something. It is on this ground that 
we talk of a moral agent. But 'reason' sometimes is also 
seen as a part of the causal relation between motives and 
actions, if nothing else at least by rules of meaning. A 
causal relation always implies an empirical regularity. 
However, it is sometimes asked whether the relation 
between 'reason' and 'action' is a mere empirical 
regularity. The explanation of action often contains 
ostensions to reasons, but the possession of 'reason' does 
not entail the performance of corresponding particular 
action. 
Some philosophers, like psychological hedonists, 
have argued that motive is pleasure and pain. But 
abandoning this narrow definition some philosophers have 
considered 'motives' in terms of disposition, others have 
argued it signifies a trait or character. It is sometimes 
argued that motives are embedded in goal or aim-directed-
actions. However, the suggestion that motive is the force 
determining action would not evoke much disagreement. In 
other words, motive impels us or carries us to certain 
determined behaviour. Motive normally forms part of an 
explanation of an agent's behaviour. In order to clarify the 
use of the term 'motive' it is necessary to demarcate and 
define the commonly interchangeable term 'motive' and 
'intention'. The appearance of feasibility to the 
interchangeability may be evoked due to the teleological 
features embedded in action. A marked difference between 
motive and intention is that the latter has wider application 
than the former. Motive may be a part of an intention. A 
peculiarity of motive is that once they become operative it 
is not possible to change them. Motives then appear to lack 
elements of consideration and choice. There appears to be 
a clear non-inclusion of 'voluntariness' in motives. In 
contrast intention clearly shows elements involving 
consideration of ends and means and of consequences. 
Intention includes motive as an element is seen from the 
following example: A father may have intention to punish 
his son for doing a wrong with the motive of betterment. 
The example shows that intention includes motive. In this 
regard, it may be argued that motive is an element of 
intention which is chief interest to achieve the goal. It may 
be considered that X has misled Y to humiliate him. Here, 
there may be motive for the X to mislead Y. If X misled Y 
as a means to humiliate, then it may also be the intention. 
However, in this dispute, without regard to something else, 
we find that motive, overt or covert, is directed action that 
is offered as explanation of action. 
'Motive' because of its involuntary dimensions needs 
to be distinguished from 'habit'. Normally, when a man is 
doing something out of habit, it is automatic and difficult to 
avoid with no expectation, whereas motive is identified with 
man's expectations or aims. The explanation of actions in 
terms of habit is marked by lack of reference to choice. 
Therefore, thesis argues that motive is goal directing. 
Motives are sometimes portrayed as reasons for 
action. Some philosophers define the term 'reason' in the 
sense of cognitive faculty or rationality. But we are 
concerned only with reason in specific relation to motive 
and action. Reason may be assigned to a person to explain 
his action. When the agent does something there may be 
reason behind that act. One may ask, for example, why he 
did, what he did etc. Thus, reason may provides an 
explanation of action. Reason explanation of action is 
sometimes assumed as causal explanation. Causal 
explanation is distinguished from reason explanation. 
Causal explanation is empirical and contingent in its 
nature. While reason explanation a logical independence is 
required between desires, feelings and beliefs on the one 
hand and of human action on the other. Causal is a 
relationship of cause and effect. It is expected that 
whenever a cause occur there will be an effect. Cause and 
effect may not be reason as such. They are not classes of 
things discoverable by reason. They may be understood 
through experience. We say, for example, Y is the effect of 
X, here x is cause and this cause may not be reason 
However, our attempt is to find out the link, between 
motive and reason. In the relation of motive and reason we 
acJm\\ \ha\ bo\h are explanations of action. For example, a 
man may have a motive to do an act, and it might also be 
the reason why he did that act. In this regard, it may be 
said that motive may coincide with reason. This 
explanation, thus, provides a ground for the conclusion that 
motive may be regarded as a reason for action. 
It is argued by some philosophers that action is 
nothing more than physical or mere movement. Yet there is 
demarcation between mere movement and action. It is 
argued that action is not bodily movement or mere 
movement. Action is performed with motives and reasons 
as well. This demarcation may be easily understood, for 
example, by the phrases: 'my arm rising' and 'raising my 
arm'. In this regard, we may say that action is considered 
only when motive or reason are involved. If it is not so then 
it is only mere movement or happening or bodily 
movement. 
It is appears from the arguments advanced in this 
thesis that motives and reasons are related to action. 
Without motive or reason there is no possibility of any 
action. A man may have motive for doing something and at 
the same time he may also have reason for that action. For 
instance, a man dies and after his death it is detected that 
his food was poisoned. Poison is the reason of his death. If 
he takes a poisonous food deliberately, his motive, one can 
say, is death. In this case, motive and reason both may be 
assigned for a certain sort of explanation. Therefore, we 
find that motives and reasons are explanatory tools for 
action. In other words, motives and reasons are identifiable 
In relation to action. 
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PREFACE 
This research work is an attempt to analyze the 
relation between motive, reason and action. The thesis 
attempts to explore how the motives and reasons are 
related to the term 'action'. The term 'action' is defined by 
some philosophers as bodily movement. The thesis argues 
that action is not simply bodily movement but involves 
motives or reasons. In other words, an action is understood 
in terms of motive and reason. 
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CHAPTER - I 
INTRODUCTION 
INTRODUCTION 
Action is an integral aspect of huma.n existence. 
The seat of the origin of action is a long-standing 
debate in phi losophy. Phi losophies of action have 
del iberated at length how action arises, and where it 
or iginates. The problem especial ly arose with the 
advent of Cartesian dual ism and the consequent 
problem of mind body relat ion. According to 
Descartes, mind and body are two separate and 
distinctly independent substances interact ing with 
each other, such that the body acts upon the mind in 
sensat ions and the mind acts upon the body in 
vol i t ions. However, Descartes could not consistent ly 
draw the consequences of his premises. Descartes 
was forced into providing the pineal gland as the 
house of the mind. 
In more modern terminology physical or bodily 
are understood as cerebral processes. In terms of 
cerebral processes we may suggest interact ionism 
holds that cerebral processes effect the mental and 
the mental effects the cerebral . But this does not solve 
the problem, which is how can two entirely dif ferent 
substances act and react with each other. Any 
content ion of Interactionsi'm cannot be devoid of the 
presupposi t ion of a certain level of similari ty in nature 
among the things interact ing with each other. In this 
thesis we are concerned with the concept of act ion, 
which in the Cartesian framework is portrayed as the 
result or consequence of the preceeding event or 
activity in or of the mind. The preceeding mental event 
or activity then is supposed to be a heterogeneous set. 
Since the mind-body problem remained therefore, 
as corol lary, the problem of action also stayed, for the 
Cartesian framework mental event was to precede the 
physical event, which was termed an act ion. Geul incx 
and Malebranche, modifying the Cartesian framework, 
propounded 'Occasionl ism; which suggests mind and 
body are opposed to each other and as such cannot 
effect each other. 'Occasionl ism' proposed that any 
correspondence between the mind and body is the 
result of the intervent ion of God. Accordingly with any 
changes in the body corresponding sensat ions arise in 
the mind with the intervention of God. Conversely, 
whenever there arises vol i t ions in the mind God 
intervenes to produce corresponding bodily 
movements. 
To overcome the dif f icult ies faced by dual ism and 
its explanat ion through interact ionism Spinoza argued 
for a model of paral lel ism obtaining between mind and 
body. For Spinoza, there is only 'the substance' of 
which thought and extension, i.e. mind and body, are 
two modes. The mind and body being two modes of 
the same substance run paral lel to each other without 
affecting / effecting each other. Spinoza, therefore, felt 
no need for interact ion between them. Psycho-physical 
paral le l ism, as the theory of Spinoza has come to be 
known, proposes that nothing can happen in the 
human body without a corresponding mental state. 
Spinoza's arguments boil down to 'where there are 
mental processes, there must be physical processes, 
and vice versa' . 
However, Leibnitz tr ies to overcome the problem 
by arguing for pre-establ ished harmony between mind 
and body. According to him, God establ ished the 
harmony between mind-body at the t ime of creat ion. In 
other words, God pre-adjusted them to each other in 
such a way that they always correspond to each other. 
For Leibnitz monads the spir i tual atoms or active 
perceiving forces make up the mind and body. 
Leibnitz, even with his theory of the pre-establ ished 
harmony, faces the same diff iculty as Occasionl ism or 
Carteslanism does in general . Leibnitz could not 
explain how God establ ished this harmony. In fact 
picture gets more compl icated, since for Leibnitz 
monads are sel f -contained. 
The empir ic ist too f ind themselves in a muddle 
over the issue. For example Hume admits that the 
supposed inner connect ion of mind and body is a 
mystery, it is only that exper ience leads us to this 
supposi t ion. Further, this supposit ion leads to the 
notion of infal l ibi l i ty of thinking and indiscernibi l i ty of 
matter, held by Descartes and Locke, respectively. 
Hume's admission tears apart supposed relat ion of 
vol i t ion and bodily movement. 
Classical western phi losophy not only fell short of 
a consistent account of mind-body relat ionship, but as 
a consequence could not expl icate clearly the concept 
of act ion. The disenchantment brought forth an attack 
by the twentieth century phi losophers like 
Wit tgenste in, Ryle, et al. Ryle is notably the most 
explicit with regard to mind and body. His book 'The 
Concept of Mind' was hailed as one of best general 
phi losophy book in the past twenty-f ive years. Ryle 
argues against what he calls the 'off icial doctr ine' , 
which hails chiefly from Descartes as traced out 
above. Ryle does not deny the mind for he admits that 
with the doubtful except ion of idiots and infants in 
arms every human being possesses both a body and a 
mind. Ryle f inds errors in the 'off ic ial doctr ine' or 
interact ionism, which lead to the 'Dogma of the Ghost 
in the Machine' . 
He attempts to show that the mistake is not in 
detail but in pr inciple. It is one big mistake and a 
mistake of a special kind, namely a 'category mistake' , 
in fact a 'category howler'. His effort can be typif ied as 
an attempt to rectify the logic of mental concepts. 
According to Ryle, it is perfectly legi t imate to say, in 
one logical tone of voice, that there exist minds and to 
say, in another logical tone of voice that there exist 
bodies. 
The mind-body relation has the underlying 
quest ion of identifying act ion. This thesis is concerned 
with whether motive can explain act ion? Is motive to 
be understood as reason for act ion? Can reason be 
understood as cause? And other similar quest ions and 
equat ions, in short, with the relation between motives, 
reasons, and act ion. Ordinari ly, action is viewed as a 
process of doing. So walking, talking etc, are 
considered act ions, whereas breathing, inhal ing, 
palpitat ion of the heart are not actions but considered 
to be simple bodily movements. It can, however be 
argued that not all act ions are bodily movements, for 
example, some phi losophers have contented that there 
are mental act ions, such as th inking. But, then in 
contemporary l i terature it is emphasized that not all 
bodily movements are act ions, they may be events or 
happenings, reflex movements. The now wel l -known 
Wit tgensteineain query-what is the di f ference between 
'my raising my arm' and 'my arm r i s i n g - d r a w s 
attent ion to the dist inct ion. My arm may rise, which 
would be a happening or an event, but raising my arm 
is an action if I was s ignal ing. In both the cases there 
are movements of certain muscles, may be the same 
muscles, the di f ference l ies, if it may be conceded that 
in the former there appears to be no place for intent ion 
but the latter can only be understood through some 
such not ion. 
Myles Brand suggests that it is only 'persons 
[who] perform act ions' . We can always divide up bodily 
movement into two types, voluntary and involuntary. 
The former involves some kinds of wi l l ing, which may 
consist of aims, targets, goals, etc., but the latter has 
no such requirements. As Michael Scott points out in 
referr ing to Wi l l iam James, "...a voluntary action is a 
movement produced by a memory image of the 
exper ience that is dist inct ive of that movement.. . Since 
every voluntary action requires a memory of the 
feel ing or appearance of the actiori, to be able to 
perform an action voluntari ly, one must on some 
previous occasion have performed the action 
involuntari ly". ' ' In other words, the content ion is that 
an act ion is to be termed voluntary provided it is 
accompanied by certain memories. Scott contrasts this 
assert ion with what he thinks Wit tgenstein says and 
goes on to argue that ". . .voluntary act ions are 
dist inguished by a feel ing of innervat ion, that is, a 
feel ing of impulsion associated.. ."^.Wit tgenstein places 
several cr i teria for appraisal of voluntary act ions. He 
suggests that one cannot unconsciously perform a 
voluntary act ion, one does not f ind one's own 
voluntary act ions surprising and one does not have an 
observing att i tude towards one's own voluntary 
act ions, one knows which of one's own act ions are 
voluntary. One can general ly directly start or stop 
one's own voluntary movements when one chooses. In 
context, involuntary actions general ly cannot be 
prevented and can only be stopped or started by 
means of other actions.^ It may be noted that Scott 
does not di f ferentiate between voluntary and 
involuntary classifying both as act ions. It is diff icult to 
see how under this classif icat ion ref lexes are to be 
understood, since it would be diff icult to speak of 
reflexes as act ions. Under Scott 's c lassi f icat ion it 
would be very diff icult to di f ferent iate between this 
terrain of argument altogether. Danto views action 
differently, without an indulgence in the dist inct ion of 
voluntary and involuntary, by suggest ing two meanings 
to the term 'act ion ' , basic and non-basic. Danto 
defines basic action as that before or preceding which 
there is no other action causing it to happen. But this 
obviously means that not every action is a basic 
act ion. Non-basic actions are identi f ied by their being 
accounted for by another act ion. For example, if we 
purchase the medicine to kill mosqui toes, then kil l ing 
the mosqui toes is a basic action and purchasing the 
medicine is a non-basic act ion, since it can only be 
understood by consider ing 'ki l l ing of the mosqui toes' . 
Danto, however, disposses of the issue of action in 
terms of ' truth condi t ions' . Smith argues," . . . the terms 
'basic' and 'non-basic ' apply not to act ions but to 
action descr ipt ions. The descr ipt ion of an action as a 
turning on, of a light is a non-basic descr ipt ion; the 
descript ion of the same action as a moving of a f inger 
is, it might be c la imed, a basic desc r i p t i on " / 
However, it pr ima-facie appears that whenever an 
action is performed by an agent, it may involve motive, 
reason, intent ion, desire, etc. Ryle points out that 
motive involved in an action is a disposi t ion and not an 
internal happening or force or activity which funct ion 
/s 
as an antecedent cause. A disposi t ion [to behave in a 
certain way when certain events occur. Motive is used 
in specif ic contexts in ordinary language and has a 
specif ic explanatory role. Motives are recognized as 
desires, aims, or intentions for specif ic object or state 
of affairs. It is ordinari ly c laimed that it is motive, 
which moves us or causes us to act in specif ic 
manner. An agent is not always determined 
completely external ly but as is ordinari ly c laimed his 
character and purpose are also crucial . Morgan 
explains that motives are tr iggered behaviour, which 
lead to a goal and only f inally after the goal is reached 
are shut off. But the not iceable aspect of motive is that 
motives are asked for especial ly when there is an 
unexpected act ion. This leads to an impression that 
motives just i fy and explain. It is obvious from the use 
of the term 'mot ive' in ordinary language that it is goal 
d i rectedness. Hedonists understood motive as a tool 
for explaining human behaviour. Motives are ordinari ly 
understood to play a large role in human behaviour. 
Al though the word 'desire ' is used in connect ion with 
food, drink and sex etc., but 'desire ' is understood 
differently as a motive. However, Makenzie suggests 
that they are interchangeable not ions. According to 
Broad, "If I recognized that I was desir ing something 
which I think an unfitt ing object of desire, this would 
be a motive for suppressing the desire or overing my 
attention from this object no such motive would 
operate on me. And the presence or absence of this 
motive might make a profound dif ference to my final 
decision".^ We may be able to di f ferent iate between 
13 
desire and motive. But then other similar concepts 
such as intent ion need also be examined. 
Some phi losophers have found 'mot ive' and 
' intent ion' to be entirely different concepts. An 
example might help to explain the di f ference between 
motive and intent ion. A ship on the sea rocks itself 
against a small island making a loud noise and a man 
'x' fal ls off the ship as it starts to sink. Another man 'y' 
tr ies to help him by throwing a log. But unfortunately, 
despite the best of efforts the person 'x' drowns. The 
motive of 'y' was to save the life of 'x' by intending to 
stop him from drowning. In this case, Makenzie wri tes, 
"The motive of an act, then is a part of the intent ion in 
the broadest sense of that term but does not 
necessari ly include the whole of the intent ion. For 
example, when Brutus helped to kill Caesar in order to 
save his country, he certainly intended to kill Caesar, 
but the kil l ing of Caesar was no part of his motive".^ 
Ardal talks of intent ions in terms of choice, "A choice 
14 
is an intent ion, not mere intent ion but execut ive 
i n ten t i on " / 
Dif ferent iat ing and defining 'mot ive' is necessary 
for our thesis since we intend to explore the relat ion 
between motive and act ion. For this purpose we need 
also to examine the term ' reason' , which may be 
understood as 'cause' . The two events in a causal 
relation may be motives or desires and action since 
one may occur without the other. Reason is an 
explanat ion of act ion. We have a reason to give up 
smoking because it may cause lung cancer. Reason is 
understood as psychological and cause is logical but 
Hume explains cause and effect as a psychological 
connection (cause produces the effects). However, 
ordinari ly we regard cause and reason as intertwined 
in action by rules of meaning. As Baier points out: 
"...it can be said that Othel lo 's reason for 
ki l l ing Desdemona was her bel ieved 
unfai thfulness to him, even though she was 
15 
not unfaithful and he merely wrongly 
bel ieved her so.. .We can speak of the 
agent 's reason for doing something only if he 
bel ieves that the supposed facts which make 
him act in this way are reasons for so act ing, 
whi le this is not required in motive 
explanat ions. 
"Othel lo 's reason for kil l ing Desdemona 
cannot be that he thinks her unfaithful to him 
unless he believes that a wife 's 
unfai thfulness is a reason for kil l ing her".® 
Normally, reason is attr ibuted to a physical event 
when an agent is involved. It is only then that it is 
just i f ied to ask for the ' reason' behind doing 
something. As Fainberg points out: 
"A peasant can give no better reason for the 
stopping of any clock or watch than to say 
that it does not commonly go right. But an 
artist easily perceives that the same force in 
the spring or pendulum has always the same 
inf luence on the wheels, but fails of its usual 
effect perhaps by reason of a grain of dust 
which puts a stop to the whole movement.. . it 
appears not only that the conjunct ion 
between motives and voluntary act ions is as 
regular and uniform as that between the 
cause and effect in any part of nature, but 
also that this regular conjunct ion has been 
universal ly acknowledged among mankind 
and has never been the subject of dispute 
either in phi losophy or common life".^ 
However, we must di f ferent iate the term ' reason' 
which is understood as exercise of the faculty of 
rationali ty and ' reason' as cause. Descartes talks 
about reason and Hegel introduces it in history. As 
Baier points out, "...the word ' reason' is used in a 
dif ferent sense...". ' '° Earl ier he had explained that 
reason ". . .would counsel everyone always to refrain 
from doing what he enjoys, from satisfying his desire 
"Reason" counsel sel f- frustrat ion for its own sake".^^ 
As Kennett, in referr ing to Kant points out, "Kant 's 
emphasis on reason is right, only individuals who are 
capable of being moved by the thought that some 
considerat ion const i tutes a reason for act ion can be 
concent ious moral agents".^^ Some phi losophers have 
and do regard action as a determinat ion, for example, 
Richard McCarty argues, "...a long tradi t ion of 
phi losophers since Aristot le has dist inguished between 
free rat ional determinat ion by internal compuls ion or 
external force. Only our actions fol lowing rationally 
from our pr inciples are cal led free or voluntary. . . " / '^ 
But others, like Morris, while discussing the tradit ion 
from Aristot le to Hume and about psychologists, point 
out that they regard reason as having nothing to do 
with the choice of ends. Stil l others argue that reason 
cannot be taken to be only the cognit ive faculty or 
element of the mind but it also has a dynamic aspect 
or moving force of its own. 
However, if reasons are causes of act ion then 
they are causes of decisions too. If reasons are 
causes of actions then decisions are further 
compl icat ions introduced in the causal chain. Morris 
points out, "Many actions can be taken to be caused 
by decis ions. If a decision is itself expl icable by 
reference to the bel ieving which explains the action it 
causes, then we can regard the bel ieving as a cause 
of the action".^"* In this regard, we may say that, 
reasons are to be di f ferent iated from causes. As Folk 
says that they are dif ferent in their method. For 
instance, we can explain to our fr iend that we could 
not attend the marr iage party because of a pain in the 
stomach. So the reason was the pain and the cause 
was the gastric t rouble. 
However, as Donnel lan points out that for Hume, 
".. . there are apparent regular i t ies between motives 
and reasons on the one hand and actions on the other. 
We expect a man bent on revenge to behave in a 
19 
certain way and a man who wants a loaf of bread to do 
certain things... regularity is the essence of causal 
connect ions.. . [it is] an ennpirical regularity... connect ion 
between reasons and actions is merely empir ical has 
been strongly quest ioned".^^ He further goes on to 
e laborate, "When we explain action by reference to a 
person's reasons, the explanatory force is not 
exhausted by the mere conjunct ion of the action with 
the agent 's possession of reasons for act ing. It is 
possible for a man to do something, to have reasons 
for doing and yet not to have done it because he had 
those reasons".^^ We find similar appl icat ion to moral 
act ion. Somet imes, when we consider the doing of an 
agent as right or wrong we may be demanding reasons 
for the doing. Surely, moral action is not a special kind 
of action but as is argued by some, it may be 
relativist ic and therefore varying between the agents. 
Ardal says moral act ion is motivated by the desire of 
an end. Broad argues that, "Any action that I ought to 
do would be right for me to do. But there might be 
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several al ternat ive act ions open to me all of which 
were equally right. Even if only one course of action 
open to me were right, or if one al ternat ive were more 
right than any of the others, we should not necessari ly 
say that I ought to do that act ion. We tend to confine 
the word "ought" in its narrower sense to case where 
we believe that there are motives and incl inat ions 
against doing the rightest action open to the agent".^^ 
The agent 's action is determined by his own character, 
purpose, activity, etc. 
However, as has been shown above, relation 
between mind and body the result of which may be the 
action performed, with which normally motives and 
reasons are found to be tied up. The purpose of my 
research work would be to explore the categor ies of 
motives in terms of reasons for act ions and their 
interrelat ions. With this purpose in mind the thesis is 
divided into the fol lowing chapters. The chapter 
'Motives' is an effort to bring together l i terature on the 
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topic with a cri t ical examinat ion to attennpt a dif ini t ion 
or the term 'mot ive ' , which may be understood as a 
determinant of act ion. Again, motive has to be 
discussed in terms of its classif icat ion desire, aim, 
goal or intent ion. Motive may be a part of descr ipt ion 
of action as an explanat ion and just i f icat ion. Our 
concern is primari ly with a conceptual analysis of the 
term motive and its correlat ion with oher concepts or 
cognates. 
The chapter 'Reasons' deals with reason, which 
may be understood as a cause of act ion. Reason, 
again, may be ident i f iable as part of an explanat ion of 
act ion. Our focus in this chapter is whether reason is 
concurrent or ident i f iable and descr ibable in terms of 
desire or reference to goals, in short, to motive. The 
broad scope of the chapter is to invest igate possible 
relation of reason to action that is whether reason may 
be broadly understood or related as cause of act ion. 
T» 
And the next chapter 'Act ion ' deals with action 
fal l ing within the problematic of 'mot ive' and ' reason . 
The dist inct ion between action and reflex is taken up 
to draw out the exact import of the concept of action 
for motive and reason. Ordinari ly, the man on the 
street classif ies action as bodily movement. But 
phi loso-phical ly we find that not all bodily movement is 
act ion. Act ion pr ima-facie seems to involve 'something 
else' or more than just bodily movement. This 
'something else' which dist inguisthes movement or 
happening from action is sought to be invest igated in 
this chapter in terms of motives and reasons. 
The conclusion of the thesis will deal with the 
possible identi f icat ion of motive and rason in terms of 
act ion. There wil l be an explanat ion of whether motive 
and reason may be assigned for certain sort of 
explanat ion of act ion. 
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MOTIVES 
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2S 
MOTIVES 
Motives, mot ivat ion, being motivated indicate the 
not static. The general impression one has about 
these epithets is of dynamism. The word 'mot ive' 
portrays a force or power determining act ion. The 
common sense classif ies or recognizes motives as 
desires, aims, or intent ions for specif ic object(s) or 
state(s) of affairs. The agent, it is supposed, wants or 
acts with the object or state of affairs insight. The 
situation of the agent determines his 'wants ' or 'acts ' . 
The 'want' or 'act ion' then can only be si tuat ional ly 
assessed or placed and therefore it pr ime facie 
appears that motives are context-dependent. The 
si tuat ion then it appears is the determining factor as to 
when whist l ing is to be understood as repeat ing a tune 
and when as eve's teasing. Being contextual ly 
or iented motive words are not strictly specif ic. Morgan 
expresses this when he says, "Thus, whi le motives do 
not tells us exactly what wil l happen, they give us an 
idea about the range of things a person will do. A 
person with a need to achieve will work hard in school , 
in business, in play, and in many other s i tuat ions"/ ' 
Morgan further explains that motives: 
". . .are aroused, they tr igger behaviour, 
which leads to a goal , and f inally, after the 
goal is reached, they are shut off. 
"A motive,. . . is not always act ive,. . .and 
can be aroused when appropr iate changes 
take place within the organism or in the 
st imulus situaiton".^ 
Avoiding the taxonomy of motives it is obvious 
that motives, whatever that may mean, definitely are 
not directly accessible and are only inferred from overt 
behaviour, including, one's own explanat ion of one's 
behaviour. In other words, descr ipt ion of motives 
involved, whether first or third person is out only 
means of access. Motives are understood by Morgan 
to be goals and means of identi fying personal i ty and 
behavioral d i f ferences, traits and character ist ics.^ We 
do not here want to enter into the debate of suitabil i ty 
of methodological behaviour ism. It may suff ice our 
purpose here to understand that mot ive-concepts are 
vague labels to be ascertained only in si tuat ions or 
contexts. 
In every day parlance there are hundreds of 
words, which are understood or misunderstood to 
signify motives, for example want, dr ive, wish, aim, 
ambit ion, hunger, thirst love and revenge, to mention 
just a few, each of which is understood to be an 
important determinant of behaviour. As Morgan points 
out, "A girl wants to be a doctor. A man strives for 
polit ical power. A person in great pain longs for relief. 
Another person is ravenously hungry and thinks of 
nothing but food. A boy is lonely and wishes he had a 
f r iend. A man has just commit ted murder, and the 
police say the motive was a revenge. A woman works 
hard at a job to achieve a feel ing of success and 
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competence. These are a few of the motives that play 
so large a part in human behaviour"." 
So we find goals or aims are natural ly dependent 
on drives or needs, which lead to motives determining 
the individual human behaviour. Peters in his 'Concept 
of Mot ivat ion' elaborates the issue: 
"Surely the reference to drives and emot ions 
in relat ion to motivat ion is an attempt to 
answer quest ions at a different level. It is 
part and parcel of hedonist ic and 
homeostat ic theor ies which seek answers to 
quest ions like 'Why do men eat?' or 'Why do 
men eat at dif ferent rates?' In other words 
reference to such causal condit ions is an 
attempt to explain the directedness and 
persistence of behaviour. 
"As 'mot ives' state goals towards which 
behaviour persists, it is easy to see how 
part icular theor ies explaining d i rectedness 
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have become incorporated in the meaning of 
'mot ive ' . 
"The terms 'mot ives ' and 'dr ive' have 
become almost synonymous.J. S. Brown... for 
instance, . . .suggested that 'one of the major 
sources of misunderstanding is the fai lure to 
dist inguish clearly between drives or 
motives, on the one hand, and habits or 
reaction tendencies on the other".^ 
However, ordinari ly the term motive is used quite 
loosely or as Ardal suggests that the term is used 
extremely widely but ". . .when we account for 
behaviour by use of one or. . . [ the motive] terms, we 
soon see that they are used to give var ious dif ferent 
kinds of informat ion.. . [to] say a man was motivated by 
anger this does not indicate that the man is 
part icularly i rasciable as rule. The choice of 
one.. . [ f rom among] the list rather than one of the 
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others may be dictated by the nature of the si tuat ion in 
which the agent f inds himself".^ 
Ardal referr ing to the long list of motive terms 
provided by Bentham suggests that use of anyone of 
these indicate a basic motive behind the a c t i o n / In 
ordinary every day life seeking the motive carr ies the 
connotat ions that the action is d isreputable. Peters 
disagrees that a motive is necessari ly a discredi table 
reason for act ing. For Peters, motive is a reason 
asked for in a context where there may be a 
suggest ion that it might be discredi table. In sol ici t ing 
the motive the demand is for just i f icat ion, not simply 
explanation.® 
Motives indicate directed act ion, to use Peter's 
phrase, but being not directly accessible cannot be 
standardized to patterns of rules. Psychological 
hedonism defined motive as being determined by 
pleasure and pain, which led Mackenzie to say, 
"Pleasure and pain are the only possible motive to 
action, the only ends at which we can aim".^ How far 
the hedonist ic theory just i f ies motivat ion is a moot 
point; going into the detai ls here would be digression 
from the present thesis. The object ive of the thesis is 
not to work out a theory of mot ivat ion. But to seek 
clar i f icat ion in the use of motive terms to establ ish or 
reject motives as causing act ion. Smith has rightly 
pointed out, "There is no special class of motive-
words. Motives are often referred to by means of 
abstract nouns such as love, hatred, fear, greed, 
ambit ion, and jealously; but the corresponding 
adject ives are often used to give habi t -explanat ions 
and therefore not to impute a motive". n 10 
Hume, Bentham and J.S.Mil l , among the 
hedonists, have maintained the feel ings of pleasure 
and pain are prime and determinant factors of act ions. 
But there being no di f ferent iat ion in kinds or types of 
actions for hedonists they are forced into admitt ing 
motives, as determinates of voluntary act ions too. But 
it may be noted that a voluntary action implies 
del iberat ion, choice and resolut ion indicat ing rational 
behaviour. 
Anyway it cannot be denied that motives are 
powerful tools for explaining human behaviour 
Motives enable us to make predict ions, if only vaguely, 
about future course of act ion. Motives, no doubt, are 
powerful means for explaining human behaviour, which 
is the reason why our everyday explanat ion of 
behaviour are heavily laden with reference and hints 
about motives. Schreier remarks, "The theory of 
motivat ion is the explanatory part of psychology .All 
psychological phenomena then, including action or 
behaviour would be motivated".^^ Peters has argued ' 
"...to ask for . . .mot ive is to suggest that this 
is very much a case of a directed action 
though the man's object ive may be hidden 
from as well as being pursued according to 
no standard patterns of rules. There are, I 
would suggest, three character ist ics shared 
by explanat ions in terms of motives, which 
account for the diff iculty in f i t t ing them 
neatly into the framework of types of 
explanat ion, which has been out l ined. In the 
first place we only ask about a man's motive 
when we wish, in some way, to hold his 
conduct up for assessment. The word is 
used typical ly in moral or legal d iscourse 
where act ions have to be justified and not 
simply expla ined. We ascribe or impute 
motives to others and avow them or confess 
to them in ourselves".^^ 
Motives of course not directly apprehensib le but 
nevertheless may be obtained inferential ly. 
Motives are a powerful means of explaining 
behaviour is obviated by the fact that everyday 
explanat ions of behaviour is in terms of motives. The 
everyday expressions of act ions clearly carry with 
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them motive terms and thus it proves to be diff icult to 
the extent of r idicule that act ion can be mot iveless As 
Smith suggests, "A motiveless action 'acts gratuit ' is 
logically impossible; for it is not something that a man 
could be said to 'decide' or 'choose' to do and so 
.. 13 would not count as an 'act ion'" . He goes on further to 
argue that we are forced to say that everything which 
we choose to do entail a motive to do it, therefore we 
are obl iged and not free to do it. The argument has 
often been used to show that free choice is not 
possible. Some phi losophers in order to escape the 
conclusion have argued that duty as a very special 
motive does not have an obl igat ion. For Smith 
obl igat ion is not identical but contrasted with free 
choice, then there are motives which do not obl ige and 
circumstances which oblige us are untoward and 
unusual obstacles. 16 
Peters understands the phrases all act ions have 
a motive to mean that all act ion can be assessed oi 
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evaluated. But motives are normally just i f icat ions for 
unusual behaviour. Peters, therefore says, "When we 
are asked about our motives we may produce one that 
is a perfectly satisfactory justif ication...".^'^ 
However, some have argued that motives are 
general states which when recognized help us to 
predict behaviour in varied situations.^® As already 
ment ioned the term 'mot ive' , as stressed by Peters, is 
used in specif ic sorts of contexts in ordinary language, 
"The general ized use of this term by psychologists, 
some of whom hold that we have a motive for 
everything that we do, has therefore a rather bizarre 
effect, which it is the phi losopher 's task to make 
explicit".' '^ Ryle in his T h e Concept of Mind' views 
motives as inducing people to do things, which help 
ordinary t ransact ions between people and without 
which ordinary t ransact ions would not be possible. He 
hints that motive is a cause to an action and motive 
and cause do not confl ict. But in his typical style he 
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goes on to argue that causes of act ions known to us 
are famil iar and usually public happenings which get 
people to act in part icular ways and in part icular 
situations.^° Mackenzie specif ies inducement to act as 
the thought of a desirable end. He is basically 
suggest ing that motives and desirable ends are 
interchangeable not ions. But Lillie argues, " . . .desires 
i tsel f . . .appear to be two aspects, on the one hand the 
inst inct ive craving or urge impel l ing a man to act ion, 
and on the other hand the end or object at which he is 
aiming which is said to induce him to the action".^^ In 
other words, the argument effects a dist inct ion 
between what might be cal led inst inct ive action and 
actions which are induced. It appears that induced 
action requires desired ends whereas the inst inct ive 
actions are not goal d i rected. The belief of a person of 
the correctness or r ightness of a certain course of 
act ion is a motive for doing it, whereas a belief in the 
wrongness would involve a motive against doing the 
act ion. But then not only r ightness or not r ightness of 
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an action may be the motives with regard to desired 
ends or consequences, as Smith points out, 'My 
motive may be fear of the consequences of 
d isobedience. . .because I have been trained to and 
obedience is now a matter of habit, and in this case I 
have no motive at al l . But I may also obey it f rom a 
sense of duty; and this is a motive".^^ The concept of 
motive needs to be dist inguished to classify it apart 
from its attending notions. However, motive can 
certainly be speculated as a conscious mental process 
moving a person in a part icular manner because of 
desires, the only possible except ion may be the 
conscious process of wi l l ing. Again as Broad points 
out, the belief that a certain action is right is motive 
for doing it. The reverse that is an action is wrong is a 
motive for not doing it.^^ 
In the most prel iminary form this thesis has to 
draw a dist inct ion long lost in phi losophy between 
intentions and motives. Jenkins has rightly pointed 
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out, "The criteria for saying tfiat a person is intending 
and for saying that he is mot ivated, and the relat ion 
which exists between these two states, are subjects 
which, in one form or another, have frequent ly found a 
place in phi losophical literature".^'* There is no doubt 
that the term 'mot ive' is not less ambiguous than 
' intent ion' . As we have seen motive may move us or 
cause us to act in directed manner. Now the term 
'cause' may mean, using Ar istotel ian c lassi f icat ion, 
either eff icient or f inal , the eff icient cause is the 
movement of the nerves; muscle etc., whereas a 
motive may be understood to be either that which 
impels and that which induces us to act in a part icular 
way. Mackenzie writes, "In the former sense, we say 
that we are moved by feel ing or emot ion. Thus we say 
that a man's motive was anger, or jealously, or fear, or 
pity, or pleasure, or pain. Some writers such as (Mil l , 
Bentham) have suggested, 'Pleasure and pain to be 
the ult imate motives'".^^ 
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Bentham and Mill understand the term 'mot ive' to 
mean 'spr ing of act ion' or feel ings and emot ions. The 
term ' intent ion ' as understood possesses the sense of 
aim, object or end of act ion. Motive, then, may be the 
eff icient cause and intention the f inal cause, in the 
Aristotel ian sense. 
But it can easily be argued that motive and 
intention both are the final cause of act ion, since both 
are descr ibed as teleological features embedded in the 
act ion. The di f ference, at the most, is that intent ion is 
wider than motive or motive may be a part of an 
intent ion. For example, in the case of voluntary action 
there is an element of considerat ion and choice, which 
are not present in motive. In other words, it appears 
prime facie that intention has elements not present in 
motive. The two, therefore, cannot be used inter-
changeably. The dif ference between the two hinge not 
on whether they are eff icient or f inal cause. The 
dif ference is in ' intent ions' involving considerat ion of 
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the end and means to achieve it, and may be also the 
consequences it may entai l . Motive then is the idea 
only of the chosen end. Intention beside the idea of 
the chosen end includes the idea of the chosen 
means. Intention thus, appears to be a wider notion 
than motive. Since it consists of the idea of the chosen 
end-means and also the consequences entai led by the 
act ion. A number of wri ters equate 'mot ive ' with 
'chosen end' . If that is an acceptable posit ion then 
obviously ' intent ion' involves 'mot ive' as an element 
in its structure. For example, teacher may intend to 
punish the misbehaviour of a pupil with the motive of 
bettering the chi ld. The example points out that 
intention includes motive. Mackenzie wri tes, "The 
motive of an act, then is a part of the intent ion in the 
broadest sense of that term..." .^^ However, intention 
and motive are often interchanged in ordinary 
language which leads Lil l ie to wri te, "A man's intention 
refers to the outside wor ld, the world of ant ic ipated 
results as they are foreseen by the agent, the motive 
refers to the state of the agents own mind, the spirit in 
which the action is done rather than the consequences 
of the act ion, al though a fully conscious motive has an 
aim which indicates the spirit of the act ion, the aim of 
getting money indicates an acquisitive spirit".^^ There 
is another di f ference between motive and intention 
though it depends on the assumpt ion that act ions 
arising from motives are not act ions which are a result 
of choice. In fact the argument suggests that 'mot ive' 
unlike ' in tent ion ' does not leave any room for choice. 
As Berofsky argues, "...I can not choose whether to 
act from hunger or thirst, unless... [ i t is a] synonym for 
'choosing whether to eat or to drink'".^^ The element of 
choice is also pointed out by Ardal , "Regarded from 
the point of view of its content, a choice is an 
intent ion; not a mere intent ion, but an execut ive 
intention".^® The variat ion with regards to relat ionship 
between ' intent ion ' and 'mot ive' might be too big to be 
dealt with in this thesis. In order to do just ice to the 
relat ionship of 'mot ive' and ' intent ion ' the minimum 
requirement would be to cover the detai ls of various 
posit ions on the issue. However, there appears to be 
suff icient ground to agree with Ross, when he says, "It 
is a highly plausible view to take that intent ion is a 
complex consist ing of dif ferent e lements and that 
motive is the name we give to one element in the 
intent ion, namely that element which is of chief 
interest to the agent. In this sense it seems to be 
roughly synonymous with aim, end and purpose".^° 
The content ion is that 'mot ive' as an element of 
intention is that part which is of chief interest, namely 
the goal to be achieved. The point can easily be 
appreciated if we consider that Sam has misled Tom to 
humil iate him. The misleading may be the result of the 
desire of Sam to humil iate Tom. But this only gives the 
motive for the misleading. However, if it is suggested 
that Sam misled Tom as a means to humil iate then we 
are not only pointing out the desire but also laying 
bare the intent ion. However, Ardal d isagrees with the 
classif icat ion that motive is that part of intent ion which 
is central for the agent. He says, "...I am not happy 
with the identi f icat ion of motive with [central] part of 
the intent ion.. . It seems that the motive somehow is 
intended to explain why the intention was formed. 
Even when we make a desire for a particular end the 
motive for an action can hardly be plausibly counted 
as part of the intention".^^ However, Ardal may 
disagree to the classif icat ion of motive in terms of 
intention it nevertheless remains without dispute that 
motive suggests a directed act ion, i rrespect ive of 
whether it is overt or covert. It also appears to be 
simpler to explain actions in terms of motives. In short, 
ordinari ly the inference accepted that motives are 
offered as explanat ions of act ion is accepted. 
Jenkins drawing the dist inct ion between motive 
and intention argues: 
"The concept of motive is primari ly an 
explanatory one; the concept of intention is, 
for want of a better word, primari ly 
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informative though cont ingently explanatory 
That is to say, the statement of intent ion is 
meant to inform us of the goal at which an 
action is a imed. 
"Intention is, as it were, the thread 
underlying all purposeful act ion; it connects 
but it does not explain".^^ 
Intending or being motivated some are appl icable only 
to voluntary act ions. Intention syntactical ly indicates 
no impulses, but motive, as has been pointed out 
earl ier, may be inst inct ive. Therefore, whenever an 
intention is talked about we can always look for a 
motive but vice-versa may not be true as Jenkins 
points but, "One cannot have an intention for a motive 
but one may have a motive for an intent ion " ^^ 
Kenny differentiates between motive and intention m 
terms of backward-and forward-looking reasons, 
respectively,"...the man who goes to the fire to get 
warm...may say that he did so because he was cold, or that 
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he did so in order to get warm". ^^  Kenny argues that the 
first is backward looking, presunnably because of use 
of past tense, and is a motive whereas the second for 
hinn is forward looking, a report and an intent ion. We 
are not going to in this thesis dwell on the fine 
dist inct ion Kenny draws, our purpose is to look at 
motive and its relation with act ion, Kenny nevertheless 
agrees with us to the extent that we also feel that 
motives are explanat ions but for him they are 
backward looking. 
The dif ference between intention and motive has 
been pointed out by Jenkins, which gathers support 
from ordinary language. He argues that a cause of 
intention is never asked for, whereas a reason is 
always demanded of motive. Jenkins goes on to argue 
that diff iculty in di f ferent iat ing arises due to treat ing 
motive and intention as pre-act ion states where 
content of the intention cannot be enumerated without 
specifying that in which the intended action consists.^^ 
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Wil l iam Lil l ie not only dist inguishes between 
remote and immediate intention but also between 
direct and indirect intent ion. For him direct intent ion of 
an act is the aim aspect of the motive. He also decries 
the dist inct ion between conscious and unconscious 
intention but then he f inds that, "It is more convenient 
to limit the words 'mot ive' and ' intent ion ' to conscious 
mental processes".^^ 
However, some phi losophers have argued that 
motive cannot be included among voluntary act ivi t ies. 
Since it is not possible to change motive or desire 
once they become operat ive. Whereas other 
phi losophers have argued that there is a di f ference 
between choosing and habit. As Smith argues, "The 
crucial contrast... between habit - and mo t i ve -
explanat ions;. . . [ is that] habit explanat ions are logically 
complete. . .mot ive explanat ions are only complete 
when such a reference is contextual ly implied".^^ The 
point being stressed here is what was argued at the 
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beginning of this chapter that motives are contextual ly 
determined. The contextual dependence is also 
stressed by McClel land who asserts that all motives 
are learnt in an affective si tuat ion. But Peters rightly 
points out that this is strange since the si tuat ion for 
McClel land is where an action produces an affect."^^ 
McClel land although right in suggest ing that motives 
are contextual ly dependent may be digressed into an 
attempt to equate motive with habit. It is obvious that 
if the learning process is involved then habit format ion 
is inevitable. Peters points out that "Allport looks at 
motives as 'habi t - in- the-making' . Peters argues that 
when we ask for motives it is the goal or a man's 
expectat ions of a goal that are up for scrutiny. 
McClel land claims that motives must always bring 
about a change. Peters points out that McClel land 
says the explanat ion of ' the boy wants to do a good 
job ' is a mot ive-explanat ion because 'wanting to do a 
good job ' defines an end si tuat ion which would 
produce posit ive effect.^^ Peters suggests that 
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McClel land's concept of 'mot ive' is "...yet another 
exannple of explanat ion masquerading as analysis...". ' '° 
Peters again goes on to suggest that, "The analysis of 
a concept like that of 'mot ive' is never merely an 
enquiry into terminology. It is an avenue of approach 
to dist inct ions, which may well be theoret ical ly as well 
as practical ly important. It has been argued, for 
instance, that the concept of 'mot ive' is needed to talk 
about the directedness of a man's behaviour in 
si tuations where he does not act out of habit and 
where he in some way seems to be depart ing from 
convent ional expectations".'*^ 
The explanat ions of act ions in terms of habit are 
marked by lack of references to the choice of the 
act ion. It may be argued that habits may be 
del iberately acquired but this does not effect our 
argument. A motive explanat ion refers to a reason, 
which is used to explain the act ion. There is obviously 
then a demarcat ion between 'habits ' and 'mot ives' , the 
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involvement of the choice of the agent. It is thus that 
Lill ie says, "On that part icular occasion, and then, by 
his vol i t ion, the agent chooses to carry out or to 
refrain from the action to which the motive leads; his 
choice will be one factor which either helps or hinders 
the recurrence of the part icular motive. In the 
developed character, as we have already seen, certain 
motives have become habitual ly predominant, and the 
agent 's own past choices have been important factors 
in determining which of his motives have become 
master motives".'*^ 
However, intent ions and motives are not dist inct 
from the action in the way that physical cause is 
dist inct from its effect. We can take the example of a 
pianist or a hockey player who plays each stroke 
intentionally. But are the intention and stroke playing 
separate from each other? The denial becomes more 
obvious if an attempt is made to identify intentions."^ 
The intent ions it is obvious cannot be identif ied 
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separately as Ryle's adverbial account of thinking 
shows. The identi f icat ion cannot be separated 
because in ordinary language and discourse far any 
signif icant piece of behaviour motive or intent ion is 
sought as the course of the part icular behaviour. In 
other words, it appears that motives and intent ions are 
understood as causes forming part of explanat ion for 
behaviour offered in ordinary discourse. But as Vernon 
points out, "It is argued by many, however, that our 
ordinary way of talking is misleading here. It may be 
true that we somet imes speak of intent ions as causes; 
but when we think careful ly we shall see important 
di f ferences between intentions on the one hand and, 
let us say, the types of causes invest igated by the 
natural scientist on the other".'''* The natural scientist 
views cause to be an antecedent to an event. An event 
for natural scientist should then only be explained in 
terms of cause and effect reduct ions. But somet imes 
cause is used by the natural scient ist as a just i f icat ion 
for a happening. The ambiguity leads to confusion and 
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it appears that Vernon intends something like what 
Ryle had said, "Motives are not happenings and are 
not therefore of the right type to be causes. The 
expansion of a mot ive-expression is a law-l ike 
sentence and not a report of an event". .. 45 
Ryle elaborates himself by point ing out that the 
glass was britt le is not suff icient to explain that it 
shattered at 10 pm The fact that the event of a stone 
hitt ing the glass happened at 10 pm is to be brought 
into the descr ipt ion. In the same way to say that a 
person is disposed to act in such and such a way, 
under such and such ci rcumstances is not suff icient to 
account for what the person did at a part icular 
moment. For example, a man passes his neighbour the 
salt out of pol i teness; but his pol i teness is merely his 
incl ination to pass the salt when it is wanted, as well 
as to perform a thousand other courtesies of the same 
general kind. So besides the quest ion 'for what reason 
did he pass the sal t? ' There is the quite different 
question 'what made him pass the salt at that moment 
to that neighbour? ' This quest ion is probably answered 
by 'he heard his neighbour ask for it', or 'he noticed 
his neighbour 's eye wandering over the table ' , or 
something of the s o r t / ^ 
Smith di f ferent iates between habit, character, and 
mot ive-explanat ions. He disagrees that motives are 
disposi t ional . His suggest ion is a tendency to lump 
together 'mot ives ' and suggest a law-l ike uniformity in 
the act ions. Smith argues that law-l ike uniformity is 
virtually a def ini t ional character ist ic for 'habits ' 
Motives too have such law-like uniformity but not 
necessari ly always.Smith argues, "Mot ive-explanat ions 
are usually given only in the case of character ist ics 
and therefore regular conduct; but this is not 
necessari ly so. A man cannot be called 'generous' 
unless he acts generously fairly often; but he can act 
once and once only on a generous impulse and we 
could then say that his motive was generosity, 
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however uncharacter is t ic " / ' ' He goes on further "If we 
wish to explain why a piece of glass broke we may 
either say that it was struck with a certain force or that 
it was b r i t t l e " / ^ 
Earl ier Ryle had argued that Ar istot le in talking 
about motives real ized such talk is about disposi t ions, 
which are dif ferent from competences. Aristot le also 
real ized that motive unlike any competence is a 
propensity, which may be strong, weak e t c / ^ Smith 
argues that the explanat ion 'struck with a certain 
force' refers to an occurrence assumed to be the 
antecedent cause of the glass breaking. But to say 
that the 'glass is bri t t le ' is to assert what Ryle calls, 
' law-l ike hypothetical proposi t ion ' to the effect that 
".. . the glass, if sharply struck.. .would not dissolve, 
stretch or evaporate but fly into fragments".^° 
According to Smith, Ryle claims that motive-
explanat ions are of the latter or d isposi t ional type. 
Ryle insists that motive is not an event or force inside 
54 
you which funct ions as an antecedent cause but a 
disposi t ion or tendency to behave in a certain way 
when certain events occur. This is obvious and in 
keeping with Ryle's basic project in 'The Concept of 
Mind' to exorcise the 'Ghost in the Machine' by 
eradicat ing the notion of antecedent events.^^ 
Smith argues that," . . .Ryle is mainly concerned to 
refute the theory that a mot ive-explanat ion must 
necessari ly refer to sensat ion.. .but he denies that an 
explanat ion in.. . [ these] terms must necessari ly refer 
to. . .cause to. . .behave. . .Both these content ions seem 
to me to be correct".^^ Peters had earl ier argued that, 
man's action can be explained in terms of traits or 
character, which may be reasons for actions but are 
not motives, for they are not goal directed therefore, 
motives may mean, "...that a man aims at a variety of 
goals by means of the same... act ion.. . [most important 
is] the directedness of motive explanat ions.. . [an] 
aspect... neglected in recent years both by 
phi losophers and psychologists. TFT^* cfa^ssic 
phi losophical discussion of motives in recent year 
occurred in.. .Ryle's [The] Concept of Mind".^^ But 
Peters f inds Ryle's t reatment of motives confusing 
because of his use of the term 'mot ive' in too wide a 
sense. Peters cri t icizes Ryle for his over eagerness to 
refute the Cartesian duality and as a result fai led to 
dist inguish between various types of d isposi t ions. 
Peters says that sometimes to ask for motive, "...is 
only to ask for the end which explains.. . behaviour".^" 
But quest ion is that what are motives and their relat ion 
to reasons? Is motive a reason or is motive a cause of 
action? 
As Ryle argues that motive is not an event or 
force, not an internal happening, not inner 
occurrences, but it is a d isposi t ion, or tendency. He 
asserts, "...the class of act ions done from motive 
coincides with the class of act ions descr ibable as 
more or less intell igent".^^ Ryle goes on to argue, 
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"Action's done fronn sheer force of habit are not 
character ized as sensible or silly...".^® Ryle is 
suggest ing that actions done from force of habit 
cannot involve motives or that motive is the intent ional 
or del iberat ive part of act ion. However, he says that 
action is not an effect of a specif ied cause in terms of 
motives or intent ions, which are subsumed under the 
category of propensity or behavioural t rend. Ryle has 
consistently argued against any reference to internal 
happenings as part of an explanat ion. Here too, he 
argues, "...to explain an action as done from a 
specif ied motive or incl inat ion is not to descr ibe the 
action as the effect of a specif ied cause".^' ' He 
excludes motives from the category of happenings, 
with the argument that mot ive-expression is a law-l ike 
sentence and not a reported event. 
He obviously prefers the disposi t ional analysis. 
The exclusion obviously debars analysis in terms of 
antecedents leading to an ad inf ini tum. Melden agrees, 
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that motive as antecedent cause of action cannot form 
an explanat ion. To strengthen his argument, he argues 
that 'a sopori f ic drug is the cause of s leeping because 
it has the property of causing sleep' is not informative 
causal explanat ion. In other words, for Melden 
explanat ions in terms of antecedents are not 
informative and therefore not causal explanat ions. 
Peters holds motives are reasons for act ion, 
which are demanded when an action needs 
just i f icat ion as well as explanat ion. For Peters then 
motives just i fy and explain act ions. Ardal too, 
suggests that motives are offered as explanat ions of 
act ions. Psychologists in general , may be fol lowing 
this content ion, suggest that motives are reasons that 
are actually operat ive. But Peters is quick to remind 
that motives might be reasons but not all reasons for 
act ions are motives. The hint is that there may be 
act ions, which may not have any motives, but reasons 
other than motives can be cited for them. 
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Peters argues, "Motives are a part icular class of 
reasons. Many sorts of things can be reasons for 
actions, but motives are reasons of a part icular sort".^® 
The part icular class of reasons is identi f ied by the 
exercise of direct ive disposi t ions such as lust, hunger, 
etc. For example, a person may steal bread to 
overcome his hunger and therefore may be said to 
have a motive. But there are lots of act ions the 
reasons for which may not be motives. The reasons 
may be the character of the person, such as, honesty, 
which cannot be classed as motive, for this is not goal 
d i rected. Peters lays emphasis on di rectedness, i.e. 
definite goals, as a dist inguishing feature of 'mot ives' . 
Peters gives as one of the character ist ic of 
motive, which is a class of reasons, for act ion," . . .goal 
which is quoted to just i fy. . . [an] action must also be 
such that reference to it actually explains what a man 
has done".^^ But then motives are not simply reasons 
if we allow 'unconscious ' motive. The motive must be 
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the reasons why an agent did whatever he did. 
Motives involve goals direct ing behaviour. Peters 
explains, "This, it is innplied, cannot be the reason why 
he bought the suit; it cannot therefore be his motive. 
But his reason might coincide with his mot ive. He 
might say that he bought the suit in order to impress 
his employer and this might also be the reason why he 
bought it. This would be an example of a conscious 
motive. If his motive was unconscious, then the reason 
why he bought the suit would be something likely to 
attract the notice of his secretary, and the impl icat ion 
of saying that it was unconscious would be that he did 
not entertain this goal as a conscious object ive. In 
other words, the dist inct ion between conscious and 
unconscious, though important in some contexts, does 
really effect the logical force of the term 'mot ive' , 
which is to imply that, whatever he says or thinks 
about it, his behaviour is actually directed towards a 
certain type of goal."®° 
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REASONS 
The term ' reason' as used in ordinary language 
has numerous and varying connotat ions although 
related to one another. The term is as old as history of 
human del iberat ions particularly the thinking involved 
in organizing. The principle of organizat ion required 
rationale and conformity to an evolved set of 
convent ions, the latter bunched together may be 
classed under the tit le of ' reason' . The long history 
has added, apart from the natural and expected 
compl icat ions further intr icacies to the use of the term 
' reason' . Somet imes the compl icat ions even obstruct a 
clearer understanding. 
One of the approaches in defining ' reason' has 
been to understand it as a faculty. Marias Jul ian, for 
example says that ' reason; in its widest sense is a 
faculty or condit ion of man. The strong shift is when 
we say of someone that he is not in his reason or is 
loosing his reason.^ Blanshard, l imits the 'faculty to a 
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mere funct ion of grasping necessary connect ions' . 
However for the Greeks reason was a contemplat ive 
faculty the dist inguishing feature of man as a rational 
animal.^ 
For thousands of years reason has played the 
role of rat ionalising religious fai th. Descartes was the 
first to give reason an autonomous status. Hegel 
introduced reason into history. However, whatever the 
developments, reason is unfortunately still not out of 
ambiguity. The development has not been able, in 
spite of all efforts, to shake off the various senses and 
connotat ions attached to it. The term is sometimes 
used to indicate the activit ies of cognit ions; sometimes 
it is restr icted to inference. But as Ginsberg points out, 
"The term 'practical reason' has been tradit ional ly 
used by phi losophers for reason in its appl icat ion to 
moral conduct".^ It is argued that actions of moral 
agents, implying that such agents would be rat ional, 
are explained by citing reasons and not courses for 
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their act ions. The pointer is to the important use of the 
notion of reason in the explanation of one's moral 
conduct or, to be more general, an explanat ion of 
one's act ion. As Baler points out that "Reason as 
explanation occurs in expressions such as 'my (his 
etc.) reason for doing this.. . 'or 'the reason why I (he 
etc.) did this... '" ' . The reasons then are understood to 
be part of 'moving the agent' or agent's act ion. Baier 
feels that nothing is found in explanat ions, which can 
be said to be the 'reason for agent 's actions unless 
the agent was moved to act by a part icular factor in 
the explanat ions. Reasons are not necessary elements 
for the agents' act ion. The reason might be there but 
may not have moved the agent. Baier points out, "In 
del iberation and in just i f icat ion a fact may be said to 
be a reason for doing something although the agent 
was not moved by it to do that thing, or al though he 
knows that he will not be moved by it".^ 
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Richards argues that there is a quite tr ivial sense 
in which reason is related to explanation that is when 
the explanation gives reason or part of the reason to 
explain an act ion. An explanation consists of a group 
of statements strung together that reduce the 
perplexity or the puzzlement of an occurrence, event, 
act ion, fact or whatever. The group of statements may 
even be large enough to form a story. The reduction of 
the perplexity or puzzlement is ef fected, for the 
occurrence, event, act ion, fact or whatever to be 
explained can in a greater or lesser degree be inferred 
from the group of statements. The groups of 
statements, in short, then are basically understood to 
be the ' reasons' for the occurrence, event, act ion, fact 
or whatever. An explanation of an action is then 
possible by cit ing reason for it. But reasons for actions 
are normally demanded only if the action is unusual, 
surprising, shocking, start l ing, etc. for example, if a 
student comes to class on t ime every morning no 
curiosity will be aroused. But if one day he comes an 
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hour late an explanation would normally be required. 
The student may reply that traffic jam delayed him. 
The teacher may accept the explanat ion, because a 
traffic jam can normally cause delay. In other words, 
f rom the statements const i tut ing the explanat ion the 
fact to be explained can easily be inferred and the 
puzzlement about the student coming late may 
dissolve. However, Richards argues, when an 
explanation is given in terms of the agent 's reason for 
act ion, then that explanation must take a special form. 
The special form is dist inguishable from other types of 
explanations by certain features. One of the 
necessary, though not suff icient, features of this 
special type of explanation is that the agent must be, 
in a sense to be explained, aware of it. Richards then 
goes on to points out, " Indeed, some phi losophers, 
e.g. Benn, Peters, and Findlay, have seen the 
dist inct ion between explanations in terms of reasons 
for action and other types of explanation as being so 
profound that they have c la imed, or pleaded, that to 
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talk truly of the agent's reasons for having acted in a 
certain way is to eschew the notion of causal 
." 6 explanation altogether". The emphasis on causal 
explanation of action requires logically independent 
classes of events to be categorized as mot ives, 
desires, intentions, etc. and act ion. There may be 
commonali ty but the condit ion of motive etc. and 
action occurr ing independently has to be adhered to if 
a causal explanation is possible. Obviously if mental 
causes are considered a part or explanation of action 
it will differ from explanation in terms of reason for 
action in so far that the former would not imply agents 
rationality and its relation to explanation whereas the 
latter crucial ly implies this. The two events in a causal 
relation may be motives or desires and act ion, since 
one may occur without the other. In a casual 
connect ion the two terms of the relation must be 
independent. 
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Richards has pointed out, "...a person to have 
acted for reasons.. . [does not require] that the reasons 
in question actually were entertained prior to act ion, or 
that any reasoning process occurred at all".^ Reasons 
then are not to be entertained in this context as prior 
mental occurrences. The reasons then are only part of 
explanation of act ion. The explanation may very well 
give motive as a reason for act ion. Reasons to actions 
may involve motives. Reasons for actions are normally 
specif ic to the intention with which the action was 
done. This implies that there may be several and 
varied forms of reasons, each specif ic to the intention 
or motive of the act ion. A person's going to the 
athlet ics ground to jog involves reason for going to the 
athletics ground viz. to jog. But then his jogging 
occurs after his reaching the athletics ground. It 
appears then that the cause i.e. the jogging fol lows, 
the effect, viz. after gett ing to the athletics ground. It 
is a truism that causal statements about particular 
events can be true only if the cause did actually occur 
72 
or exist. But it may well be true that the person went to 
the athletics ground in order to jog even though he 
never jogged. If as is being assumed that the cause is 
jogging then there appears to be no cause for going to 
the athlet ics ground in case the person does not jog. 
This appears to be a paradoxical situation where an 
action or event occurs without a cause. But, as 
Donnellan explains, this problem arises basically 
because the object of desire or motive is understood 
as cause rather than desire itself. Donnel lan further 
explains, " . . .desire. . .existed prior to his going, and it 
existed whether or not he finally gets bread".^ There 
are many valid grounds for dist inguishing between 
reason- explanations and causal-explanat ions. One of 
the major ground for dist inguishing is that causal-
explanation is empir ical and contingent in its nature, in 
the reason explanation a logical independence is 
required between desires, feel ings and beliefs on the 
one hand and of human action on the other.^ 
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A cause not only is thought of as producing its 
effect but also as explanation of the effect, 
i rrespective of whether the effect is substant ial or a 
sinnple change. Richards gives three types of reasons 
for action the first is conclusive reason for choosing 
something; second is a good or general ly suff icient 
reason for choosing something, and finally there is 
some or a reason for choosing something.^° A choice 
of whatever kind entails an act of will or vol i t ion, 
which, as Myles Brand points out, "...can be construed 
as referring not to mere bodily events, but rather to 
motives or desires or wants, or to uses an all 
encompassing term, reasons".' ' ' ' 
Donnellan points out, " . . .c lassical reconci l iat ion.. . 
claim[s] that acts of will cause intentional actions and 
are in turn caused by one's motives, desires, and 
beliefs; and motives, desires, and beliefs are 
mentioned in giving a man's reasons for acting".^^ But 
Richards warns, " . . .explanat ions in terms of the 
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agent's reasons for action take a special form and 
must, therefore, be dist inguished from the general 
notion of explanation which the reasons for expresses. 
But, of course, they are, st i l l , causal explanat ions and 
this fact should not be obscured or denied".^^ There 
might be a vast dif ference between determinat ion by 
reason and determinat ion by natural causes. But 
nevertheless, as Falk points out, ".. . the affinity 
between reasons and causes cannot be ruled out a 
priori . . .". '" ' Falk asserts that reasons and natural 
causes differ in their method and as such may have 
nothing in common.^^ Donnellan also admits 
". . .explanations of actions in terms of reasons... lend 
support to the belief that these explanat ions are 
causal. . .ordinary language... employs.. .word "caused" 
and frequently the word "because" where motives and 
reasons are involved".' '^ Reasons for action may be 
regarded as causes in so far as we refer to them in 
explanat ion. But cause and effect are not classes of 
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things discoverable by reason, they can only be 
apprehended through experience. 
As Peters points out, Hume contrasted reason, 
which is inert, with passions that he regarded as what 
moved one to act ion. Peters asserts that Hume did not 
appreciate that passions are not dist inct entit ies but 
intimately connected with the use of reason.' '^ Baler 
explains that Hume thought that our ends are to be 
determined by our desire, which are in turn determined 
by our empir ical nature. The function of reason is to 
work out the best means to achieve our ends. This 
brings in the notion of choice, which is determined by 
reasons.^° According to Alan: 
"All this helps to explain how it is that while 
causal language does provide a temptat ion 
to argue that casual behaviour cannot be 
free, it can at the same time be used in a 
way that seems quite compatible with freely 
wi l led decisions. In the first place the 
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dist inct ion may be drawn between total and 
partial causes, enabling us to talk of 
behaviour that is free within l imits. Secondly, 
however, this idea of a 'partial cause' can 
somet imes be very confusing, and it may 
often be clearer to talk rather of necessary 
condit ions. 
"For there is no reason why a 
necessary condit ion should as such and on 
its own have any posit ive tendency to bring 
about anything else at all".^^ 
Baier in, T h e Moral Point of View' tried to show that 
means-ends are related to moral principle in exactly 
the same way as reason. Baier shuns the notion that 
there are two quite different types or employments of 
reasons, namely means-ends and moral reasons.^° He 
goes on to argue; 
"Reason is not a nobler, higher, more 
authori tat ive desire, we can think of a 
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person without this or that desire, even 
without any desires. 
"We can also think of a person with 
desires, but without practical reason".^^ 
Blanshard argues that reason may be a factor in 
improving moral life but theoretic reason inf luences 
conduct indirectly. Plato and Aristot le recognized a 
'practical reason' , which inf luences action more 
directly.2^ 
In the above discussion there is an attempt to 
present or construct the term ' reason' as 'explanat ion 
of act ion' . The explanation is dependent on the context 
of an agent 'moving to act ion' . Baier points out, 
"Infact, of course, this is not part of the claim made by 
means of the word ' reason' in an explanatory context, 
where we always speak of 'someone's reason".^^ The 
talk of cause, reason, action as Danto points out, 
"...does not so much show that reasons are not 
causes, as that it should not be an accident that 
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events causally traced to a man's reason should make 
the latter come out true".^'' He goes on to add, "That 
phi losophers insist ing upon a dist inct ion between 
reasons and causes have supposed that reasons are 
essential ly or necessari ly connected with what they 
are reasons for. In any case, we can modify our claim 
this way: If m intends r, he intends that r should be 
made true by him because he intends that r, and that 
this not be accidental . We shall later note that not only 
must one believe what one believes to be true, but 
true for the reasons one has for believing it".^^ 
In order to get a clearer picture on the issue 
involved, we need to dist inguish between just i f icatory 
and explanatory use of the term ' reason' . The 
just i f icatory element is present when reason for an 
action is given containing reference to factors not 
dependent on one's believe or thoughts, for example, 
to cite the stuff iness of the room as reason for 
stepping out of the room suggests its just i f icat ion. The 
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explanatory aspect is present when the thought that 
the room is stuffy is reason for stepping out. Baier 
puts the matter by saying when a man says that his 
reason for refusing to play tennis is that it is wrong to 
play games on Sundays, he may speak truly even 
although it is Saturday and though there is nothing 
wrong with playing on Sunday. He has a reason for 
refusing and that is his reason and, therefore, this 
26 cannot be the reason (justif icatori ly speaking). Baier 
dist inguishes between uses of reason in cases of 
del iberation and just i f icat ion by pointing out, that 
del iberation is prior whereas just i f icat ion is posterior 
27 to act ion. He goes on to add that if we are moved by 
reasons to do something then the reasons consti tute 
the act ion, but "If, on the other hand, we are looking 
for reasons in an explanatory context, we are looking 
not just for reasons: we are looking for that person's 
reasons, his reasons for doing what he did. Causal 
explanation requires establ ishing the cause and effect 
relat ionship. If reasons are to be classif ied as causes 
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for action then a similar relat ionship is required. In 
continuation of our earlier argument we may agree 
with Alan when he says, "...we may discover the 
causes of an avalanche without having to believe that 
it had a reason for fal l ing.. .however to note that there 
is generally a broad dist inct ion of some sort to be 
drawn between reasons and causes".^^ It is expected 
that whenever a cause occurs there wil l be an effect. 
In terms of behaviour, a behaviour that is not caused 
is normally classed as erratic and wil l have no 
possibil i ty of general izat ion except for being lumped 
together into a heterogeneous class of erratic act ions. 
Cause may at t imes be misinterpreted to mean 
compulsion but actually they are simply reasons for 
things happening. In ordinary language cause and 
reason for action are intertwined by rules of meaning. 
It would be too large a digression to deal with the 
arguments related to the connect ion between reason 
and f reedom, freewil l or cause. It will suffice for our 
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purpose to accept that reason is int imately connected 
with these terms. In the present thesis the attempt Is 
to find the link, if any, between motive, reason and 
action, even if In the negative sense that we might 
have to, for lack of suff icient argument, abandon the 
very notion of there being such a link. If such a link is 
at all present then it would be that motives can be 
viewed as reasons for act ion. Alan argues that 
simplist ic and most natural suggest ion is that while 
causes make things happen there is f reedom to act 
according to one's reasons. The reasons would then 
be viewed as causes of action as this suggests 
del iberat ion. The categories of reasons and causes 
are only exclusive when we are to explain freewi l l , for 
a reference to cause cannot be accounted as 
reference to f reedom. But then the exclusivity 
disappears when reason is cited since this 
dist inguishes between an agent 's action and fal l ing of 
trees or avalanches occurr ing. The freedom does not 
assert the exclusivity of reason and cause but of 
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reason and natural causes. It is some such reason, 
which led Alan to argue that let us, suppose, for 
instance, that your aunt keeps twenty-four cats. You 
may explain her col lect ion either by referring to the 
emotional background that has caused her to act like 
this or by cit ing the reasons that she herself gives. But 
it is not possible to give full weight to both sorts of 
explanations at the same t ime. And if indeed it is the 
causal explanation that you take more seriously, you 
will most probably refer to her reasons as mere 
rat ional isat ions. For if causes bring about their 
effects, if they really do this, then caused behaviour 
surely cannot be considered as free.^° 
Baier argues that to ' l ike to do something ' is 
classif ied as 'want', which then is a reason for doing 
whatever needs to be done. He goes on to dist inguish 
between two different senses of 'want' that is desire, 
or, as argued in the second chapter of this thesis 
motive. He cites 'I want a cup of tea' as a request but 
5.-> 
this does not, according to him, clarify the context 
since he can always be asked 'do you really want 
another cup'? 'You have had five already', the second 
question in fact is 'do you really desire another cup'? 
Baier asserts, "The fact that one wants something in 
the first sense, is not a reason for having it. But if I 
want something In the second sense, that is, have 
a.. .desire.. . then I do indeed have a reason".^^ Baler 
further goes on to explain: 
"We must now ask ourselves whether the 
way other people feel about something is 
regarded as a reason for us to act in certain 
ways. 
"Precisely what we are asking? 
Consider the case of Aunt Elizabeth who 
would enjoy a visit from her nephew Charles. 
"Suppose that Charles does not care for 
his aunt, but he cares for his mother and 
that his mother would be pleased if he 
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visited her sister. Let us say that Charles 
enjoys pleasing his nnother, at any rate likes 
to please her from a sense of duty or a 
feeling of f i l ial piety although he does not 
actually enjoy doing so. In that case, he has 
a reason for visit ing his aunt, because doing 
so is also eo-ipso pleasing his mother and 
he enjoys doing, or l ikes to do, that. If he 
hesitates, his mother might appeal to him in 
this way: 'if you don't do it for your aunt 's 
sake do it for mine' . This is not the exact 
case we want, because here the agent has 
at any rate a self-regarding reason, that he 
enjoys or l ikes pleasing his mother. Since we 
mean only 'pr ima-facie reason', ' reason all 
other things being equal ' , there can be no 
dif ference between the two cases. For a 
prima-facie reason is as much a reason for 
doing something as a reason against not 
doing it. It is only reasons on balance which 
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may be merely just i fying without binding 
us".^2 
Only reasons are not necessari ly just the cause and 
effect relat ionship. Reason is not to mean the 
commonly understood causal relation in the sense of 
inference. Myles Brand points out: 
"The logic of the causal relation is different 
from the reason-behaviour relat ion. The 
causal relation is transit ive: if A caused B 
and B caused C, then the first caused the 
third to move. But the reason-behaviour 
relation is either intransit ive or non-
transit ive; in all (or some) cases, if a reason 
causes certain behaviour, then the reason is 
not a reason for the effects of the behaviour. 
Suppose that I want to please Mary Smith. 
This desire leads me to have f lowers sent to 
her. But unknown to me, she is dreadful ly 
allergic to f lowers and they cause her to 
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have an al lergic attack. Though I had a 
reason for sending her f lowers, I had no 
reason for init iat ing an attack. 
"Davidson argues.. .a person can have a 
reason without knowing all that it is a reason 
for. I did not know that one of the 
consequences of giving Mary Smith f lowers 
would be an al lergic attack. Or if one claims 
that the total goal of the reason (desire, 
motive, or so on) is always known, the 
argument can be refuted by observing that 
reasons are proximate rather than remote 
causes. In the bil l iard ball case, the first ball 
moving is the proximate, immediate cause of 
the second's moving, the second is the 
proximate cause of the third, but the first ball 
moving is not the proximate cause of the 
third-it is the remote c a u s e " . " 
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Feinberg suggests that, " . . . transit ion of thought from 
the cause to the effect proceeds not from reason" '^^  
The sense employed here Is of a procedure which is 
other than act ion. The sense of reason in this context 
is not as is ordinari ly used. Baler points out; 
"It will be admitted that we have a reason for 
giving up smoking, because smokers run the 
risk of contract ing lung cancer. 
"This consti tutes a reason, because, in 
a world of brute fact, lung cancer is the 
effect of smoking".^^ 
Baler further explains, "Only the fact that I would enjoy 
doing something if I did it can be a reason for doing it, 
that I would enjoy it if I cont inued, a reason for 
cont inuing to do It".^® Baler stil l further explains: 
"Everybody must agree that the fact that he 
would enjoy doing something is a reason for 
him to do it; that he would not enjoy it is a 
reason for him not to do it. 
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"That there is a good f ishing in a 
certain holiday resort is a reason for some 
people, not for others, to spend their holiday 
there. What makes it a reason for some is 
that they enjoy f ishing. It is a reason for all 
those who enjoy fishing".^' ' 
It is that enjoying doing something is a reason for me 
to like to do it. Baier thinks that to like to do something 
can never be a reason for enjoying it. The implicat ion 
is that ' l iking to do something ' is not the reason. The 
reason is that which is enjoyed for which I do 
something. In other words, the l iking and enjoying are 
both l inked to something else that is the reason. 
Therefore, enjoying and l iking are comparat ively 
independent of each other. When we speak or when 
we talk in terms of reason we normally mean choosing 
the best reason for doing something. Again reason in 
this sense is specif ic to the agent of action and is not 
necessari ly reason for the act ion. As Stroll correctly 
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points out, ". . .use of "cause" in connect ion with 
human actions. For we speak, not of the causes of 
actions but of what caused agents or persons to do 
this or that. And among the sorts of things we cite as 
causes in the field of human act ions-the things that 
cause persons to act in such-and-such ways - are 
reasons of peculiar sorts not encountered in the 
domain of physical events: reasons that are not the 
reasons an event took place but the reasons an agent 
has for doing, and which, as reasons that are relevant, 
good and suff icient, show the action to be right and 
reasonable, as distinct from the reasons we cite in 
physics or physiology which merely show how it is that 
events are brought to pass". Therefore, it might be 
correct to argue as Baier does, "We employ principles 
of the superiori ty of one type of reason over another. 
We all believe that reasons of self- interest are 
superior to reasons of mere pleasure, that reason of 
long-range interest out balance reasons of short-range 
interest, and reasons of law, rel igion, and morality 
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outweigh reasons of self-interst".^^ It is these 
considerat ions which lead to such actions that may 
present say for example pollution and maintaining of 
ecological balances. It is obviously felt undesirable to 
allow pol lutants, which in the final analysis damage us. 
The reason then may be said to motivate the act ion. 
We have been arguing that reason is identi f iable 
and describable in terms of desire or reference to 
goals, in short, motive. This point is expressed by 
Myles Brand in his 'The Nature of Human Act ion ' . 
Suppose that in a meeting I have a motive (reason) for 
signaling to the chairman, suppose also that just as I 
am about to signal, someone or something prevents 
me. I could nonetheless identify and describe my 
motive, not by the resultant behaviour-which did not 
occur -but rather by the goal of having been 
recognized by the chairman. Sometimes in fact we 
identify or describe a motive by referring to the 
resultant behaviour. ' '° 
It is obvious by now that our concern is not with 
the novel notion of reasoning which entail a level of 
rationality. Any view suggest ing that there is such a 
'novel ' reason for action is distort ing the whole issue. 
Richard points out, ".. . the notion of acting for reasons 
which Is quite intel l igibly applied in case of 
unreflect ive, habitual an action as can be imagined, 
yet I do it for a good reason".''^ 
In any talk about reason as cause of action the 
sense of reason is not the novel one which entai ls a 
second reasoning behind the action but the sense that 
there is 'good reason' for the act ion. However the term 
'cause' is itself ambiguous and is used in a wide 
variety of ways but as Stroll points out, "...we speak of 
causes relevant to actions in the sense in which these 
are the putat ive causes an agent has for doing what 
he does - causes that are the reasons he offers in his 
explanations and in his so-cal led self- just i f icat ion but 
all of these.. .are.. . rationalizations".^^ 
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A source of confusion in the whole issue arises 
from our everyday ontology where mental and the 
physical are understood to be clearly demarcated into 
public and nonpublic events. The actions being public 
are therefore understood to be physical in nature and 
are dist inguished from other physical events because 
of their understood relations to the mental events, 
which are supposed to be their cause or their effect. 
Stroll Avrun says, " . . .events which funct ion as causes 
or effects in some sort of mechanisms of the mind, 
which at crucial points interact with events in the body. 
When. . .menta l events produce bodily movements In 
the way in which the sight of a fr iend and the warm 
feel ing produces the motion of the arm, then we speak 
of the bodily movement in the way in which we do as 
the action of waving one's arm in fr iendly greet ing. To 
perform the action is, strictly speaking, to make the 
relevant bodily movement happen in causal 
consequence of the interior mental event".^^ 
It is the supposed ontology, which hinders a clear 
perspective on reason as cause for action as Myles 
Brand points out: 
"...a reason (that is, a desire, or motive, or 
event, or so on) is logically tied to its effect. 
For reasons cannot be identif ied or 
descr ibed without referring to the resultant 
behaviour. For example the only way to 
identify, or "pick out", a reason for one's arm 
rising is by referring to its effect, the arm's 
r ising; and the only way to describe this 
vol i t ion is to call it 'an arm-rising vol i t ion ' . 
"Since reasons are not logically 
independent of their resultant behaviour, 
reasons do not cause this behav iour " / " 
It can be argued that just as through paddling a cycle 
moves similarly through the immediate control of his 
muscles a man raises his arm. But this sketch shows 
occurrence of internal bodily events. Melden argues: 
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"Suppose this picture to be true. Then surely 
I must know which muscles to move. If I 
cause my arm to rise by moving certain 
muscles, just as I cause the door to unlock 
by turning the key in the lock, then just as I 
can give a true account of the bodily 
movement I perform in the latter case so I 
must be able to give a true account of 
something I do in the former case. When I 
turn the key in the lock, I may know very 
little if anything about the mechanism of 
locks or the manner in which keys inserted 
and turned in locks produce their famil iar 
effect, but surely I can tell without inspecting 
or observing what I am doing that I am 
executing a twisting maneuver with my hand 
as I f irmly hold the key in the lock. So I can 
raise my arm only by doing something that 
causes my arm to rise, just as I can unlock 
the door only by turning the object cal led "a 
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key" in the thing commonly described as a 
l ock " / ^ Melden further goes on to explain, 
we should make it clear that my raising my 
arm is not the effect of some immediate 
interior bodily doing of mine. Therefore, one 
does not raise one's arm by performing 
another doing, which has the motion of one's 
arm as e f fec t -one simply raises one's a r m / ^ 
It is a similar reason, which might have led Stroll 
to say, "...a person explains his action by saying what 
he wanted to achieve, and in such a case it would be 
claimed that his desire was the cause of his act ion. 
But it is not always so easy to convert the phrases 
which people use when they state their reasons for 
their actions into phrases denoting causes " / ^ Stroll 
further goes on to argue, "...when an action is 
performed for a reason, it is caused by the agent 's 
desire and information, and that, if he gave his reason 
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in ful l , . . . i t was caused by that desire and that 
in fo rmat ion" /^ He further asserts: 
"...a desire cannot cause an action if it is 
conceptual ly connected with it, this 
contention might be meant in a very 
ambit ious way...If a desire cannot be 
identif ied except under a descript ion which 
connects it in some way with the act ion, it 
cannot cause the act ion. 
"It ought to be not that a cause must be 
identi f iable under a descript ion which does 
not connect it in any way with its supposed 
effect, but, rather, that it must be ident i f iable 
under a descript ion which does not connect 
it causally with its supposed effect. This 
content ion is much more plausible, because 
the suggest ion that an event is caused by 
whatever caused it is not even 
mythological". ' '^ 
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Donnellan with a slightly different view argues, "It is 
not enough merely to point out some logical 
connect ion between the concepts of desire, belief, and 
feel ing and that of act ion; the connect ion must be one 
which is clearly absent in undisputed case of causal 
connections".^" The argument being presented is a 
long running dispute regarding the absence or 
presence of logical connect ion in causality. We do not 
want to indulge in the issue for two basic reasons. 
Firstly, the debate would be a digression not of any 
help to us. Secondly, the scope and space of the 
thesis does not permit a digression of the magnitude 
required for this issue. We may for our purpose dwell 
on the issue only so for as might be absolutely 
necessary without taking up too much space, our main 
purpose is not to argue over the logical part icles of 
causal relat ionships. The purpose of the thesis is to 
enquire whether a relat ion, may be causal , exist 
between reason and action whereby reason may be 
broadly understood or related as cause of act ion. 
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In this connect ion we may agree with Myles 
Brand when he suggests that Davidson rejects the 
cause and effect relat ionship as cont ingent," . t h e 
statement 'every true causal statement is empir ical ' is 
false. For him "causal statement" apparently refers to 
any statement that contains the words, "cause" or 
"effect" and hence, his claim is clearly correct; "The 
cause of B caused B" is indeed a non-empir ical , true 
causal statement. But this claim does not refute the 
argument. The first premise says that it is logically 
possible that the event labeled "cause" occurs and the 
event to be labeled "effect" does not occur. It is 
logically possible, for example, that one bil l iard ball 
hits another and the second ball does not move".^^ 
Donnellan on the other hand argues that want ing and 
desir ing are tendencies to action and as such it would 
not be correct to count them as causes of act ion. If 
they cannot be counted as causes then it would be 
odd to construe their relation to action as contingent. 
But Donnellan is wil l ing to concede, "... if the program 
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is the more modest one of showing that reason 
explanations are not causal explanat ions, then the 
prognosis seems more hopeful".^^ 
The issue of causal descript ion has also been 
taken up by Stroll who argues, "... a singular 
statement of a reason for an action really may be 
interpretable as a causal statement with general 
entai lment. . . therefore need a descript ion of the cause, 
or at least the possibi l i ty of a descript ion of the cause 
which wil l not make the entai led general statement 
analytic. So.. .when I talk about the elements of desire 
in the cause, I shall be using the concept which I have 
been call ing 'the core'".^^ Richards argues, in a similar 
manner, ". . .when a person does an act for an 
insuff icient reason (e.g. dr inking alcohol , where this 
frustrates many other ends), then to explain his action 
is truly to apply a causal general izat ion about a certain 
type of irrat ional agent to his case (perhaps he lacks 
the full desire to be rat ional, though he has the 
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concept and capacity). A similar account seems 
possible for other cases where there are true 
explanations in terms of an agent's reasons".^" We 
may tend to agree with Myles Brand when he says: 
"...we ordinari ly talk (we say "my reason for 
raising my hand was to attract the 
chairman's attent ion", rather than "my 
reason for having my hand rise was to 
attract the chairman's attention"), reason 
should be thought of as causing behaviour. 
What a reason causes will have to be the 
behaviour associated with the action if we 
are to elucidate "performs an act ion" in 
terms of "reasons"... i f acting is a reason 
causing something and if this something 
were an action then in acting we would have 
to have a reason for the reason for. . .and so 
on ad infinitum".^^ 
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ACTION 
A number of activit ies such as walk ing, talking 
etc. are possibly performed only because we possess 
the necessary apparatus for them. We can portray the 
matter laying less emphasis on physical metaphors by 
suggesting a descript ion in terms of our inherited 
tendencies. In that case, all such act ions are 
inst inct ive and arise out of our inherited tendencies. 
There is no doubt that all our actions involve bodily 
movements. Apart from the bodily movements our 
actions, it is sometimes argued, might be completed 
without what might be called overt means. In most 
cases the means of an action is implicit ly defined 
within the kind of action it is. The 'kind of act ion' is a 
general way of employing the phrase when we speak 
of doing something or performing an act ion. Myles 
Brand suggests that, "Persons perform act ions. They 
move their muscles, raise their arms.. .mental activity, 
such as solving a mathematical problem or keeping a 
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secret, are also act ions,. . . . In any case, it is a fact 
about the world that persons perform actions".^ But it 
being evident that persons perform actions does not 
mean that there are no problems to be confronted 
concerning human act ion. There are a number of 
problems including,". . . explanation of act ions, causes 
of act ions, knowledge of actions, and evaluat ion of 
actions or their consequences.. . ."^ 
However, there is at least a logical possibi l i ty of a 
clear demarcat ion between simple bodily movement 
and action to use the Wit tgensteinean pert inences, the 
two different phrases 'raising his arm' and 'his arm 
rising' indicate a difference in signi f icance and 
meaning. An easiest posit ion is that a person raises 
his arm includes more than his arm rising. To simply 
equate human action with bodily movement is to 
propagate naive behavior ism. Prichard is right when 
he points out, that according to Cook Wi lson, "...in 
considering an action we have to dist inguish three 
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things: f irst, the action itself, the originat ing 
something: second, the required wil l ing to originate 
this: and third, the required desire to originate 
th is. . .What we will and what we desire are the same 
viz. the action."^ 
The debate with regard to 'act ion' has osci l lated 
between the proponents of the argument that action is 
nothing more than physical or bodily movement and 
proponents of the argument that act ions are bodily 
movements plus something else or at least a bringing 
about or effecting a change. Cook, for example, 
belongs to the latter category of phi losophers. 
Phi losophers like Melden, belonging to the former 
category, argue that actions are mere happenings or 
bodily movements and nothing more. Davidson points 
out, "Melden, for example, says that act ions are often 
identical with bodily movements, and that bodily 
movements have causes; yet he denies that the 
causes are causes of the actions. This is, I think, a 
no 
contradict ion. He is led to it by the fol lowing sort of 
considerat ion; 'it is futi le to attempt to explain conduct 
through the causal efficacy of desire-al l that can 
explain is further happenings, not actions performed 
by agents. Some causes have no agents. Primary 
among these are those states and changes of states in 
persons which, because they are reasons as well as 
causes, make persons voluntary agents'". ' ' Rescher 
agrees: 
"An action must always be something done 
by an agent. 
"In saying an action is something an 
agent does, we insist on its being an 
instance of his agency. 
"An action must have the aspect of 
physical activity, either posit ively by way of 
doing or negatively by way of refraining. 
Thus purely mental acts done solely in foro 
interno cannot qualify as actions. 
I I I 
"Every action must have an overt 
physical component and involves bodily 
activity some of sort".^ 
Again it may be argued that there is a dif ference 
between an act ion, which may be caused, and one, 
which is chosen when the aim of the doing can be 
enquired. In other words, actions may be classif ied as 
types of broad categories of whether they are caused 
or mot ivated. In case of motivated act ions the aim, 
goal, intention or purpose can be legit imately sought. 
But as Rescher points out, "Although both causes and 
motives provide answers to the quest ion, 'what led him 
to do it?' the latter alone answers the quest ion, 'what 
considerat ions led him to do it?' (Both causal and 
motivat ional explanations can in many cases be given 
of one and the some action - e.g. Smith 's sitt ing down 
when he feels his knees giving way because of 
dizziness.). We can, in short, inquire into the agent 's 
purpose, wishes, goals, and object ives; his reason, 
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object ives, and intentions".® However, the basic 
question is as Compton points out, "... is there anyway 
in which.. .physical ly undetermined actions may be 
determined by nonphysical means without violat ing the 
laws of the physical world?".^ The quest ion arises 
because earlier Compton has suggested that we have 
"...an i l l -defined idea that in our act ions some 
inf luences are effective which are not descr ibable by 
physical laws".^ 
Another approach to the issue is in terms of not 
only agency but moral or ethical agency where the 
question of voluntary or involuntary action arises. 
Normally, actions performed under duress, coercion or 
compuls ions are regarded as involuntary. We may 
include within the category of involuntary act ions, as 
some phi losophers do, such as are performed in 
ignorance. The earl ier type of involuntary act ions are a 
result of external as 'without' cause with no control of 
the agent. Such involuntary actions might be the result 
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of some natural calamity or it might be the result of 
some threat, etc. by another agent or agents. But as 
Feinberg points out, "...the case is not always so 
clear. One might have to consider an action performed 
for some f ine end or through fear of something worse 
to fol low. Act ions partake of both qual i t ies, though 
they look more like voluntary than involuntary act. For 
at the t ime they are performed they are the result of a 
deliberate choice between alternatives, and when an 
action is performed the end or object of that action is 
held to be the end it had at the movement of its 
performance. It fol lows that the terms 'voluntary' and 
' involuntary' should be used with reference to the time 
when the acts were being performed. Now in the 
imaginary case we have stated the acts are 
voluntary".^ The moral question is highly relevant and 
pertinent as Baler points out," . . . responsibi l i ty is also 
incompatible with indeterminism, since if human 
actions are not caused at al l , not even by the agent, 
then no one is responsible for them..."^° It may be 
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remarked here that in ordinary language, as Von 
Wright points out,".. . the word "act' and 'act ion' are 
pretty nnuch used as synonyms".'"'' To mention this is 
crucial here so that no confusion arises in the use of 
the words. 
A responsibi l i ty for action is normally and usually 
f ixed or talked of In terms of fixing only if provided the 
action is free or the agent is free or assumed to be 
free. The concept or notion of responsibi l i ty is 
complementary only to the notion of free agency, 
where a different choice or f reedom to choose 
between alternatives is possible. As Hornsby remarks 
"Chisholm only thinks that nothing is a free 
action if it is not caused, and that nothing is 
free act ion, if there is some event that is a 
suff icient causal condit ion for it. And 
because he takes it to be incontrovert ible 
that human beings sometimes act freely, he 
is then led to seek a novel account of the 
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causat ion of act ions. The proposal is that in 
cases of act ion, causat ion relates persons to 
events. Consequently actions are caused, 
but determinism, which concerns causation 
by events, is supposed not to touch the 
belief that actions are free. 
"No event is the action of a person 
unless something about that person's states 
of mind occurs essential ly in an explanation 
of that event; and so we cannot get it across 
that there was an action without somehow 
including something which entails that, that 
sort of explanation is in the offing".^^ 
Hornsby further goes on to suggest that, "...for a 
person to cause an event is for an action of his to 
cause it, from which it fol lows that our own actions 
may be among the events that we cause, but they are 
so only if our own actions cause".^^ The suggest ion is 
that there is a bringing about of an event that is a 
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change in the world which is categorized as human 
act ion. Von Wright argues, "...acts [are] a kind or 
species of events. An act is not a change in the wor ld. 
But many acts may quite appropriately be descr ibed as 
the bringing about or effecting ('at wil l ' ) of a change. 
To act is, in a sense, to interfere with the course of 
nature".^'' Danto on the other hand argues that, 
"...[an] event can occur without being an act ion, 
something in excess of the event itself is required in 
order to fill the space between being an event and 
being an action".^^ Danto states that if there is an 
act ion".. . then I am entit led to a class of predict ions 
(and to a class of explanations) to which I would not 
be entit led were.. . [ there] a mere bodily movement".""^ 
Von Wright while dif ferentiat ing between act 
category and act individual suggests, "The logical 
dif ference between acts and events is a dif ference 
between 'activity' and 'passivi ty ' . An act requires an 
agent. An individual event is the taking place or 
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happening of some generic event on a specif ied 
occasion. An individual act again is the doing of a 
generic act on a specif ied occasion by a specif ied 
agent".^'' The agency of an action may be an individual 
or a group (unif ied in its action), such as when board 
of directors act, parl iament acts etc. 'A cause the table 
B to move' is a general descript ion, which does not 
dist inguish between an 'act ion' and an 'event ' or 
'happening' . Therefore, as such 'A causes the table 'B' 
to 'move' cannot be claimed to be an act ion. However, 
there are actions that fall under the general category 
of 'causing X to happen'. The 'causing' may be a hall 
mark of classifying an 'act ion' . 
The Wit tgenstein 's case of 'one's arm r is ing' and 
'raising one's arm' is in point. In normal c i rcumstances 
it may be that my arm rises as I signal but it is not 
conf irmed that it is an 'act ion, ' it may be a happening 
or an event. Whereas raising of the arm is a 
describable act ion, which may be signal ing to a fr iend 
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to stop him. In both cases we find movements of 
certain muscles, but in the first there is no cause 
whereas in the second there is a cause. However, as 
Myles Brand points out, "...this descript ion leaves it 
unclear whether or not an action has been performed, 
performing an action cannot be one of the truth 
condit ions for 'causing something to happen'".^® Taylor 
points out that Descartes' regarding something as an 
action depended on perspective. Al l that is actually 
present in an al leged action is cause and effect. In 
other words, for Descartes, an event can only be 
classif ied as an act if it effects a change. The event of 
opening a window is effecting a change in the 
c i rcumstances where the window is c losed. Chisholm 
points out: 
"What more is there, then, to the concept of 
an act? First, there is the fact that the agent 
himself, as we have seen, is a causal factor. 
We must say that at least one of the events 
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that is involved in any act is caused not by 
any other event, but by the agent, by the 
man. Causation is a relation that holds, not 
only between states or events, but also 
between agents, as causes, and states or 
events, as effects. 
"And, secondly, there is the fact that the 
concept of an act is essential ly te leological . 
"Action involves endeavour or purpose, 
one thing occurring in order that some other 
thing may occur. And this concept of 
endeavour, or purpose, must be 
dist inguished from that of want or desire".^^ 
If this posit ion is not accepted then as Berofsky points 
out," . . .psychology reduces to physiology, and the 
al leged explanations of human action have succeeded 
only in changing the subject, in substi tut ing 
explanations of bodily movements for explanat ions of 
action".^° Berofsky goes on to argue, "If this gap 
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between matters of physiological fact and matters of 
human action is to be bridged, at least some token 
concessions must be made to our everyday discourse 
about persons and their ac t ions"^ \ The ordinary sense 
finds it impossible to give in to the notion no dif ference 
between 'human act ion' and 'events in the inanimate 
wor ld ' . Vernon is right in saying, "It seems typical of 
act ions, intact, that they involve bodily movements. 
When I wave a greet ing, my arm moves; when I get up 
and close the door, my body moves; I cannot kick a 
football without moving my leg. But, more interesting 
than this, there are cases where one and the same 
bodily movement performed in different contexts can 
represent different actions".^^ 
The dif ferences are differences in behaviour. The 
behavioural di f ferences attr ibuted to dif ferent persons 
may be divided into two broad categories, viz. self and 
other. But then this implies, as Danto points out that 
there will be two meanings of the term 'act ion' 
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depending on whether it is ascribed to ourselves or to 
others, provided meaning is determined by verif icatory 
procedures. But then, "...if the term [action] is to be 
employed univocally, we either must know directly 
which events, in the case of others, are actions and 
which are bodily movements; or we must, in our own 
case, only know the difference between them by the 
indirect ion of coherentist procedures''.^^ It appears a 
logical as well as conventional requirement that action 
has to be dist inguished from mere happening for the 
term to be signif icant. The dist inct ion needs to be 
drawn between ' intentionally moving one's leg' and 
'unintent ional ly ' or 'unwitt ingly moving one's leg' 
Berofsky mentions that for Melden,* human action is 
not def inable in terms of happenings or relat ionships 
between happenings; there can be no causal 
explanation of human action in terms of desire, motive, 
reason or intent ion; all causal explanation is of 
*A1 Melden Free Action. London Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1961 chap 5 7, and 14 
and pp 43-55 
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happenings; there can be no causal explanation of 
act ion; some actions are done not by doing anything 
e lse .2 ' 
Action has an air of hol ism. If I ride a bike, the 
riding is viewed as my action and not the number of 
paddles I have gone through. The holism is a 
peculiarity of the attachment 'having in mind, ' 
' intent ion' or 'mot ive' for act ion. This also suggests the 
peculiarity of actions that it can not be subdivided if 
taken as a part icular act ion. However, Rescher points 
out: 
"Some "actions" are in fact courses of 
act ion: they can be part i t ioned into 
component act ions, as with the opening of a 
combinat ion lock. But other act ions are 
simple and indivisible. And precisely 
because of the mental ist ic f ini tude of human 
beings who can not have in mind an infinity 
of diverse items, every compound course of 
23 
action wil l be divisible into some terminat ing 
- and so finite - list of component simple 
act ions. 
"Kenny* thus suggests that, any 
character izat ion of an action is inherently 
incomplete, and capable of fuller and fuller 
elaborat ion. 
"Action descript ions can be analyzed 
into specif icat ions at varying levels of detail 
of answers to manageably small number of 
quest ions about different aspects of 
action".^^ 
Some phi losophers, such as Von Wright, to overcome 
the problem, sharply demarcate acts from activity. The 
dist inguishing feature of act and activity, according to 
them, is the dif ference between performing or making 
something happen and keeping the happening or 
happenings going on or cont inued. An activity is then 
Kenn> Action. Emotion and will London Routledgc & Kcgan Paul Ltd \^)6^ p ihO 
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related to a process in the same way as an act is 
related to an event or a happening. The effects of the 
two are then very different, an act effects the 
happening of events whereas an activity keeps the 
process going. Von Wright therefore, goes on to 
suggest, "Running need not leave any ' imprint ' on the 
world, but smoking may leave smoke. As a 
consequence of drinking a person may get drunk. 
Getting drunk is an event, and drunkenness a state".^^ 
It has often been argued that action presupposes 
or requires some activity. The prerequisite of human 
actions, it may be argued, is bodily movement, if we 
are to exclude mental acts from it. These bodily 
movements are an activity an agent has to be engaged 
in if he is to perform some acts. Most of the t ime 
human activity is found to have a beginning and an 
end. Von Wright points out, "The beginning and the 
ending of activity have, sometimes at least, the 
character of acts. To run is an activity, but to start 
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running or to stop running are acts of a kind",^^ Von 
Wright in another article suggests that the events may 
be changes or transit ions from one state of affair to 
another, but sometimes it is a transit ion from a state to 
a process. In a part icular situation where a window is 
shut the opening of it may be an act ion. But in another 
case, where a window is kept open by an operat ion of 
a spring the opening is not dependent on any action 
but the closing would be the result of an act ion. Von 
Wright suggests, "The terms 'change' and 'event ' must 
then be understood in the broad, general ized sense, 
which covers both changes (events) and not changes 
(not events). This correspondence between act and 
change is an intrinsic or logical tie".^^ 
There is an element of del iberat ion in action 
where one can assert that bodily or muscle movements 
are not simple happenings. I make my arm rise by 
moving my muscles. Act ions are something more than 
mere happenings or bodily movements. The whole 
126 
question rests on what dist inguishes an action from 
mere happenings or events. Danto in his 'Basic Act ion ' 
defends four theses as fundamental to the theory of 
act ion: 
"(i) If there are any actions at al l , there are 
basic act ions. 
(ii) There are basic actions. 
(iii) Not every action is a basic action 
(iv) If a is an action performed by m, then 
either a, is a basic action of m, or else 
it is the effect of a chain of causes the 
originat ing member of which is a basic 
action of m".^^ 
Kenny points out that, for Aristot le an event can be 
quali f ied as an action provided the agent acts of his 
own vol i t ion. Danto too points out that for Hume action 
is an event caused by vol i t ion. Berofsky points out that 
the most l ikely candidate for human cause is events 
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l ike the sudden f lare-up of anger that causes a man to 
beat his child.^° However, Danto goes on further to 
add, "Thus, when m does b as a basic act ion, this 
must for Hume be counted an episode of t ranseunt 
causat ion: there is an event, itself a vol i t ion and part 
of m, who himself is but a shower of events 
ontological ly on a par with the volit ion in quest ion, this 
vol i t ion causing b in the only sense of 'cause' we now 
need countenance. Not every action, of course, is of 
this sort, for experience instructs us that some events 
cannot be directly caused by vol i t ions. Some are 
actions only because caused by events themselves 
caused by vol i t ions, these being just what we have 
marked out as mediated actions".^^ Kenny points out 
that 'voluntary' and ' involuntary' are contrar ies such 
that many things we do are neither voluntary nor 
involuntary. Therefore, "... it seems clear that a 
person's subsequent state of mind can have very little 
to do with whether a part icular action is voluntary, 
involuntary or neither".^^ 
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Philosophical ly 'wi l l ' is understood to be one of 
the tr ipart i te divisions of the soul. Modern philosophy 
has replaced the notion with location to be found 
through inner sense. Vol i t ion is therefore taken to be 
an action of the will and is assumed to be necessary 
for voluntary act ion. As Kenny points out "The freedom 
of the will is to be located in the indeterminacy of 
these internal vol i t ions. The occurrence of vol i t ions, 
and their f reedom from causal control is a matter of 
.> 3 3 int imate experience". Hornsby clari f ies the issue, 
"The empir ic ist view, that conations are causes of 
actions admits in its turn of two variants. It may be 
said that the events that are causes of act ions are 
actions, or this may be denied » 34 
Ryle in the concept of mind argues against the 
very notion of internal act ion, which can be labeled 
'conat ion' . Ryle proceeds to argue that conations 
cannot dist inguish between 'mere movement ' and the 
voluntary movement that are act ions. The Ryiean 
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regress basical ly is a pointer that if actions are causes 
of actions then there is an infinite regress in the 
series. Ryle argues that if action is viewed as a 
compound event wherein the end event is caused by 
volit ion then these cannot be viewed as an act of the 
wi l l , as is convent ional in common parlance. For if an 
action is the result of a voli t ion which is itself an act 
then this action of the will would also require a prior or 
accompanying act and so on, ad inf ini tum. In short, if, 
according to Ryle, it is a precondit ion of action that it 
should be preceded by another action then the latter 
action would also necessari ly require an action to 
precede it and so on leading to an infinite regress. 
Ryle's arguments forbid the postulation as a necessary 
condit ion of an action preceded by an event that is 
c laimed to be an action. Hornsby points out, 
" . . .causation as a link between events in which agents 
part icipate and those events in the world beyond them 
for which they may be held responsible".^^ It has been 
argued after Ryle that there can only be inductive 
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grounds for an action and there can be no necessary 
entai lments. Danto wri tes, "It is rather that one could 
not enter the claim of act ions.. . i f . . .as a condit ion.. . 
must. . .do something first: for that condit ion then has a 
condit ion that one do[es]. . .something else first, and 
this runs viciously to infinity. So if there are mediated 
actions and cognit ions, there must be act ions and 
cognit ions, which contain no further act ions and 
cognit ions as components. These are act ions we do 
but not through any distinct thing which we also 
do,. . .Such act ions.. .as these I shall call basic, and 
mediated one's are accordingly non-basic".^^ 
The basic action may include mental act ion, 
which does not have further action or cognit ion as 
components. These basic actions may in turn be 
responsible for the consequent ial act ion. The trouble 
with interior acts, including wi l l ing, as Berofsky points 
out is "...a mare's nest of confusions''.^^ Berofsky 
further goes on to say that descript ion of wi l l ing as an 
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action independent of its consequences must come 
forth "Let us call the act of wil l ing 'A,' then A produces 
B (a muscle movement), this being taken to be a 
causal sequence. Now in general if A causes B, a 
descript ion of A other than that it has the causal 
property of producing B must be for th-coming, 
otherwise 'A causes B' degenerates into 'the thing that 
produces B produces B'".^® Danto has argued that 
action of an agent is basic only if there is no event 
embedded in that action such that it causes the latter 
and is itself done by that agent. Danto says, "...this 
does not in any way entail that basic actions cannot be 
caused, even caused by the agent himself, if they are 
responses, and if it is the action which is the effect 
and not its component simple event".^® 
Elsewhere Danto has explained his notion of 
basic action by suggesting that it has the quality of 
given-ness as contrasted with 'act ion' which is caused 
to happen. Therefore, "Analogously, an action a, if a 
132 
basic act ion, is a start ing point for the performance of 
another action b, of which it is at least part of the 
cause. "Is caused by" and "is inferred f rom" are 
analogous relations in the theories of knowledge and 
of act ion, respec t ive ly " / " And again he goes on to 
argue, "Phi losophers have sometimes thought, there 
may be two species or perhaps two concepts of 
causat ion, one of which is routinely exempl i f ied when 
events are explained through other events, whi le the 
other is exempli f ied hardly less routinely, when we 
explain an event through an agent who directly caused 
it to happen as in basis ac t ions" /^ Dante's theory of 
action can only be fully understood by contrast ing 
basic and non-basic act ion. For Danto if there are to 
be any act ions at all then there must definitely be 
basic act ions, especial ly in so far that they depend on 
other actions for their occurrence. In other words, non-
basic actions are identif ied by their being accounted 
by another action that may itself not be caused by 
another act ion. The latter are classed as basic actions 
but are not themselves caused by the act ions. Danto's 
basic actions can then be construed as the breaking 
point of the Cartesian infinite series depicted by Ryle. 
Hornsby explains: 
"Danto himself bel ieved that cardinal 
dependence betv\/een actions was of a 
causal kind. He said (1) B is a basic action 
of X if and only if (i) B is an act ion, and (ii) 
whenever X performs B, there is no other 
action A performed by X such that B is 
caused by A. 
"(2) B is non-basic action of X if there is 
some action A performed by X, such that B 
is caused by A"."*^ 
Basic action is over and above the physiological series 
as Danto explains, "If the basic action which consists 
of m raising his arm is ident ical, as I have proposed it 
is with a physiological series which terminates in m's 
arm raising, then if the first exempli f ies immanent and 
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the second transeunt causat ion, we hardly can have 
derived our concept of transeunt causation from our 
experience of basic act ion. If basic act ion, thus is a 
complex event and transeunt causation is exempl i f ied 
in compound events, there is not, in the former, the 
required pair of events to be related under the concept 
of t ranseuncy" /^ 
Danto as a way of explanation suggests electro-
st imulat ion of the brain sett ing off a series of events 
identical with the basic act ion, and says, ". . .were to it 
occur to me, my experience would be of raising my 
arm 'for no reason'. . .nor as part of mediated action. 
The action whereby I activate the electro st imulator is 
not a component of the basic action thus caused. What 
I have performed rather, is a mediated action with a 
complex effect. It is a mediated action which has a 
basic action both as its start ing point and terminus".'*' ' 
Berofsky suggests we cannot identify what one does 
with what one makes happen. The dif ference is that 
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between my arm gett ing raised and raising my arm. 
The arm gett ing raised may occur through no domg of 
mine like when someone else might raise my arm ^^ 
Berofsky goes on to argue that the dif ference is a 
dif ference of wi l l ing the raising of the arn^, which 
involves vol i t ion, "So I move my muscles by 
performing an act of volit ion which in turn produces 
muscle movement"/® But Berofsky admits that an 
objection can be raised against this argument, "Here 
someone may retort impatiently: 'when I will a muscle 
movement, I wil l it and that is the end of the matter; 
there is no other doing by virtue of which this act of 
vol i t ion gets done - I simply wil l the movement of the 
muscle' . But even if this reply were correct it would not 
serve to explain what an action is as dist inguished 
from a mere happening - it explains the 'act ion ' of 
raising the arm in terms of an internal action of wil l ing 
and hence all it does at best is to change the locus of 
action"." ' ' Hornsby argues, "And the sort of answer we 
expect to the question 'what did he do?' Is not 'His 
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body moved' ('His arm rose', 'His knee bent'), but 
rather 'He moved his body', ('He raised his arm' , He 
bent his knee'). It is the same when we go beyond the 
agent's body to describe his act ion: what he did, we 
say, was melt the chocolate and we cannot say that 
what he did was the chocolate melted So it 
appears.. . i f there is... in an identi f icat ion of actions 
with bodily movements, then they must be movements, 
not movements, that are action - his movings of his 
body, not his body's movings".'*® However, Hornsby 
goes on to suggest, ".. . the account of the puzzle lead 
us to suppose-which is as cause to effect? The drift is 
plain. Unless we allow that actions are dist inct from 
movements, we cannot say how the latter are, but the 
former are not, caused by the contract ions of muscles 
And unless we push actions right back inside the body 
We cannot make good sense of talking about an action 
as a person's contract ing his muscles".' '^ There might 
be a possibi l i ty of describing all actions as mere bodily 
movements, which imply that action can exhaustively 
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be described as bodily movement and all other 
descript ions can be replaced by bodily movement 
descript ions. But then we are no longer speaking of a 
part icular act ion. The descript ion of act ion as basic 
might be understood to be a basic descript ion of 
act ion. And as Hornsby points out: 
"Things done correspond to kinds of act ion, 
and descript ions of actions determine kinds 
of act ions. 
"So we are forced to say that 
descript ions of actions that take one inside 
the body are more basic than their bodily 
movement descript ions. But this seems to be 
exactly right, if a genuinely causal notion of 
basicness is at issue".^° 
Danto sketches two different kinds of non-basic act ion, 
the composi te and gestures. Both the kind of actions 
are dependent on some basic act ion. The composite is 
an aggregate or col lection of a number of basic 
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actions, the events in conriposite action need not have 
any causal connect ions. All that is required is 
performing the basic action in appropriate movement, 
like in dance. The gestures require performing of a 
basic action like raising the arm in order to bless, 
which is non-basic. Danto in this case points out, 
"What we have is a basic action performed in 
conformity with a rule which l icenses a re-description of 
it as a blessing, provided the agent is in a posit ion to 
play the role of blesser".^^ Danto further goes on to 
argue, "Now clearly, there are neither composi te 
actions nor cognit ions on the one hand, nor gestures 
and their cognit ional counterparts on the other, unless 
there are basic actions. For these have basic actions 
and cognit ions as components. So, that there are non-
basic actions and cognit ions other than mediated 
one's does not change the analysis. But concept of 
mediat ion yields the regressive argument to basic 
actions, and only mediated actions and cognit ions 
comprise a non-convent ional, that is, a causal or a 
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logical l iaison between what is known (or done) and 
that through which it is known (or done)".^^ What is of 
more interest to us in this thesis is explained by Danto 
when he suggests that in a mediated action one is 
related to an event through being directly related to 
another event, an event which causes the former event 
and hence is mediately related to it. But in basic 
action there are no events to be directly related to 
except to the performer himself therefore, ".. . the basic 
action then is an effect, and the intent ion, since a 
cause, is not a component of the effect, nor hence a 
component in the basic action itself. So we may 
consider basic actions apart from intentions, much as 
we may consider basic cognit ion apart from such 
beliefs as they may cause".^^ In this sense motive can 
be regarded as a cause of action or basic act ion. 
Wit tgenstein 's famous query about the dif ference 
between 'my arm rising' and 'raising my arm' implies a 
query with regard to an act of vol i t ion, which has been 
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argued against by Ryle. But Berofsky disagrees for 
whom 'raising of the arm' is different from 'my raising 
of the arm' in so far the latter requires certain 
antecedent actions therefore he says, "Hence the 
doing required in order to preserve the dist inct ion 
between 'moving certain muscles' and 'certain muscles 
gett ing moved' must be a doing other than the doing 
descr ibed as 'moving certain muscles".^" Berofsky 
considers how do I raise my arm as an unfair quest ion. 
My signal ing can easily be demonstrated by raising my 
arm and therefore a real possibil i ty of satisfying the 
curiosity. IVIy raising arm, according to Berofsky, is 
exercising a primit ive ability. Berofsky has attempted 
to show that, the causal model of natural sciences 
does not fit the everyday explanations of act ions in 
terms of intentions, interests, desires, etc. Berofsky 
goes on to say, "It is not even our concern, in asking 
how someone did such and such, to inquire into the 
natural history of his act ion, to probe as it were, 
behind the scene of human action itself, to discover 
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events in an area that const i tutes the general causal 
condit ional action".^^ The descript ion given of 'my 
signal ing' is the kind of explanation which is required 
and in this as Berofsky points out, ". . . there is radical 
disparity between [ these]. . .explanat ions; causal 
explanat ions of events and our famil iar explanat ions of 
human actions".^^ 
Berofsky attempts to get rid of the notorious 
connect ions frequently talked about between causality 
of decision and choice whereby inner something is 
required. For him, it is absurd to dist inguish between 
bodily movement and an action by referring to decision 
and choice. His argument rests on that a lot of 'doings' 
are without decisions and therefore decision cannot be 
uniformily considered to be an antecedent of an 
act ion. And therefore there is no need for a recourse 
to 'behind the scenes' events. Berofsky makes the 
point clear, "Far from carrying us behind the scenes of 
action to events that somehow produce act ions, 
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decisions and choices are intel l igible only within the 
arena of act ion. By reference to them we may 
characterize, not bodily movements as act ions (for that 
they are actions we already know when we ask 
whether a person has decided or chosen to act as he 
does), but actions as those the agent has decided or 
chosen to do and hence actions for which reasons of 
one sort or another can be given. It is, therefore, 
essential to decision and choice - no mere logical 
accident as it were - that there be agents, actions and 
reasons for doing".^' ' The reasons for not accepting 
causality might be the fear of determinism but this is 
not so as Feinberg points out, ".. . from the fact that my 
action is causally determined it does not necessari ly 
fol low that I am constrained to do it! and this is 
equivalent to saying that it does not necessari ly fol low 
that I am not free".^^ 
It is possible to dist inguish action on the basis of 
strength of the desire involved for the act ions. But 
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then we are talking about act ion, which is 'del iberates' 
involving choices or vol i t ions. In other words, there are 
actions ranging from impulse to del iberat ion 
reciprocally related to desire. Strongest desire leads 
to impulsive action and del iberation tones down the 
desire. As Lil l ie Wi l l iam points out, " . . .wi l l ing appears 
to be a matter of degree.. .The essential mark of 
vol i t ion or wil l ing is that the character or the 
personality as a whole.. . is thrown upon the side of one 
motive".^^ 
The argument hinges on whether choosing, 
deciding, preferr ing, etc. are to be classif ied as doing 
or whether they are to be cited as motives or reasons 
for act ions. Smith points out that, in some cases we 
choose without doing anything, a decision does not 
entail a choice. He goes on to suggest, "The fact that 
people choose to do what they have decided to do is 
not something that we discover by observat ion of 
human behaviour. A man may decide, for example, to 
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vote for Jones and be prevented from doing so by 
sickness or cancel lat ion of the elect ion. But, in default 
of such explanat ions, there is no logical gap between 
deciding and doing".^° The explanations, are primari ly 
reasons stated as explanat ions. But these reasons 
cannot be classif ied as motives. In other words, we 
have to dist inguish between a del iberate thrust 
towards act ion, which involves motive, and act ion, 
without a thrust it may be explained by cit ing reason. 
Smith further elaborates, "If a man decides to do 
something in the future he may fail to do it because he 
has changed his mind; but it would be absurd to say in 
this case that he had not really decided. A change of 
mind may be sudden and inexpl icable. In this case ex 
hypothesis no reason can be given for it, and if a man 
decides to do X and suddenly changes his mind and 
does Y he acts irrationally. (There are other ways in 
which act ions can be called ' i r rat ional ' , for example if 
the agent has no good reasons for bel ieving that they 
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will produce the end which he desires; and in most 
uses ' i r rat ional ' is an opprobrious word. I do not wish 
to imply here that every action which deviates from a 
decision in an inexplicable way is irrational in any of 
the other senses or to imply that we ought never to act 
in this way").^^ 
The dist inct ion between, choosing and deciding is 
made when either the person has been prevented or 
he has changed his mind. Man may choose from sheer 
habit or absence of mind in other words without being 
able to specify any reason for a choice. Smith 
dismisses these cases as 'min imal ' and as such does 
not consider them. These minimal cases from our point 
of view might be cases involving strong motives. As 
has been pointed out earlier there is a reciprocity 
between motive and reason. The stronger the motive 
lesser the reason. The motive themselves then are 
reasons for the actions. Jagewan and Alvin point out 
that Aristot le dist inguishes between ".. .rat ional 
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choice.. .of a course of action aiming at the good from 
appetite and says explicit ly: 'Appetite opposes rational 
cho i ce ' . . . . " " 
Ardal points out that Barnes explains what he 
takes an action to be as acting in choosing and that 
choice is an intention but not necessari ly an executive 
intention. Barnes only recognizes action to originate 
from choice.^^ we do not want to get into the 
argument, for it does not serve our purpose, whether 
omissions are also to be counted as act ions involving 
choice and intention for which we may be responsible. 
The case of omission only shows a lack of motivat ion 
or reason for non-action or omission. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is obvious and often usual to question human action 
in terms of the goal or end towards which it is directed or 
the rule to which the action conforms. Normally, the 
paradigm case of human action is when reason can be 
specified for doing whatever is being done. It can be 
argued that we have a motive for everything we do in our 
life. Thus, we might say, motive is the arena from which 
action springs. But it is not necessary that if a person has 
a motive for doing something then he is bound to do it. A 
man may have a motive for killing someone, but he may 
have excellent reasons for refraining from doing so. One 
definite way of explaining human behaviour is by referring 
or alluding to motives. This thesis has been an effort to 
bring out the relation between motives, reasons, and 
action. However, in order to clearly bring out the 
relationship initially motive had to be distinguished from its 
related concepts, especially those which are treated as 
interchangeable in ordinary usage. 
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Most actions, it has been argued, are goal directed. 
Apart from introducing ttie thesis in the first chapter we 
have argued that it is nnotive, which moves or causes us to 
act in specific manners. Therefore, we can understand 
motives as justification and explanation of action. In 
ordinary usage 'desire' is the most frequently 
interchangeable term for 'motive'. We therefore took the 
opportunity in the first chapter itself to distinguish between 
'desire' and 'motive' in order to purge it of the connotations 
it has gathered. In ordinary usage desire is equated with 
food, drink, sex, and so on. The differentiation between 
'desire' and 'motive' was necessitated primarily to separate 
motive as a concept related to action. Ordinarily 'motive' is 
used and has the connotations of being asked as part of 
some unexpected or disreputable action or as a 
requirement only in a court of law. Motive is different from 
desire, for example we may have desire to go somewhere 
or buy a car, not motive. However, we were not more 
concerned with desire because the purpose of the thesis is 
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not to elaborate the concept of desire but to explore only 
clarification in the use of the term 'motive'. 
In the next chapter we have tried to differentiate 
between 'motive' and 'intention'. 'Intention' in ordinary 
usage is also understood as similar or interchangeable with 
motive. The second chapter shows that motive may be a 
part of an intention or intention is a term with wider 
connotations than motive. The chapter shows that motive 
primarily belongs to an explanatory model whereas 
intention is more informative than explanatory. It has thus 
been argued that intention informs us of the goal at which 
an action is aimed and motive gives the explanations of the 
actions in terms of the goal. Since, it could be seen that in 
demarcating 'motive', we found it to have an explanatory 
function with regard to action, it appeared that such an 
explanation may be understood to be 'reason' for action. 
We therefore in the third chapter explored the relationship 
between 'motive' and 'reason'. As pointed out earlier the 
paradigm case of actions would be that for which reason is 
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specifiable. It thus seems that reason also functions as an 
explanation of action. The reasons cited as explanation 
may be as diverse as specifying character of a person or 
be specifics virtually appearing to explain action in terms of 
causes. Normally, the terms 'cause' and 'because' seem in 
ordinary language to be used where motives or reasons are 
involved in explaining an action. Reasons treated as 
causes for explanation of action in terms of reasons for 
action may lend support to the view that such explanations 
are causal. However, the third chapter is an enquiry into 
whether reasons can be broadly understood or related as 
cause of action. Thus, in this chapter we find that reason is 
distinct from cause. Suppose that 'x' while driving the car 
suddenly learns of the roadblock ahead due to an accident, 
stops the car and turns it around to go back and proceed 
on a different route. In this the reason for turning around is 
the accident, while the cause was the steering wheel. The 
reason, i.e. the accident, explains the action. The reason 
as an explanation is identifying that which moves the agent 
to action. The that which moves the agent to action may be 
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the motive or desire. As such reason may be equated with 
motive. 
The fourth chapter discusses the notion of 'action' in 
relation to bodily movement and assigning 'motive' or 
'reason' to the agent. If motives or reasons are not 
assignable to an event then it can only be regarded as an 
event or a happening. The chapter discusses the 
classifying of action as voluntary or involuntary or, on the 
other hand, basic or non-basic. The discussion in the 
chapter, however, shows that an action is not simply bodily 
movement. The thesis has established so far that motives 
and reasons are both explanatory tools for action. The 
thesis now as conclusion needs to explore the possibility of 
identification of 'motive' and 'reason' in terms of action, 
which may help explain an happening as action. 
For Peters, motives are a particular class of reasons. 
He points out, "Motives...are reasons for action which are 
asked for when there is an issue of justification as well as 
of explanation. The question then arises as to the type of 
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explanation that is offered when a motive is suggested For 
not all reasons for action are motives. This is obvious 
enough; for we can ask whether a reason for an action is a 
motive".^ But as Peters himself points out Bentham 
considers pleasure, pain, or some other events as motive 
prompting. But for Hume the primary source or spring or 
motive of action is not reason, but taste. He points out that, 
"Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of passions, 
and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and 
obey them".^ Mackenzie interprets Hume to be using the 
term 'passion' as practically synonymous to 'impulse' . He 
then goes on to argue that if this is the case, all actions 
being dependent on impulse, then it has at least to be 
admitted that 'reason' shows us the way to pursue a motive 
to the best of our advantage. Mackenzie goes on to assert 
that reason may then be seen as setting before us ends or 
motives not available to an irrational being. Therefore, 
Mackenzie says, "In this sense, then, reason is capable of 
furnishing us with motives to action".^ But as Peters points 
out, "We can ask of a reason for an action 'was that his 
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motive'?. But we cannot ask of a motive, without in some 
way repeating ourselves 'was that the reason why he did 
it'? Our preliminary problem about the concept of 'motive' 
is to specify its delimiting criteria within the general class 
of 'reason for ac t ion ' " / Baier, too, has argued that due to 
the indiscriminate interchange in the use of 'motive' and 
'reason' philosophers have been confused about the 
distinction between reason and motive. As a result 
philosophers have been quite arbitrary about the intricacies 
of the issue, which has led to a hopelessly distorted 
picture.^ An example may show the difference between 
assigning of motive and reason. If Tom suddenly dies or 
goes mad and it is discovered that his food was poisoned. 
The poison may be the reason for Tom's dying or going 
mad but it can be asked 'Did Tom himself have a motive?' 
In other words, it can be suspected that Tom might have 
himself added the poison with some motive. Take an 
example where we imply motive, suppose Tom kills Jemina 
because she has fallen in love with another person. In this 
case Tom's motive of jealously is easily assignable. Thus 
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there was a motive to give a certain sort of explanation, 
one in terms of motives and not in terms of causes. 
Hov\/ever, Baler points out, "If reasons are not 
distinguished from motives, it is obvious that reasons must 
also be something of this sort, and if they are facts, then 
the moving power must somehow be lodge in these facts, 
are the stimuli which arouse certain responses in the agent 
or that they are the conditions which must be satisfied if an 
agent's tendency to act in a certain way is to be 
realized...let us remember that the word 'reason' occurs in 
deliberation, justification and explanation. 'Motive', on the 
other hand, Is at home only In explanation. When we 
distinguish 'reason' from 'motive', we are therefore merely 
distinguishing 'reason as used in explanation from 
'motive'".^ Normally, where an agent is involved reason is 
attached as a quality to a physical event. In the third 
chapter we had pointed out that reason may be a part of an 
explanation of action. The explanation may present a 
motive as a reason for action and therefore is identifiable 
and describable in terms of desire or reference to goals, or 
motive. 
However, motive may affect the moral status of the 
agent's action. The rightness or wrongness of an action 
may depend on the motive involved, as Broad points out, 
"...that a man's belief that a certain action which is in his 
power is right is a motive for doing it, and that his belief 
that a certain state of affairs which he could help to bring 
about would be good is a motive for aiming at it...Kant 
holds that the rightness or wrongness of a volition depends 
wholly on the nature of its motive. It does not depend on its 
intended consequences except in so far as the 
expectations of these form part of the motive. Of course a 
mere idle wish is of no moral value. But provided we 
genuinely try to carry out our intention, and provided our 
motive is right, then the volition is right no matter what its 
consequences may be".^ Broad further goes on to explain 
"An action is right if and only if the agent's sufficient 
motive in doing it is the fact that he recognizes it to be 
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required in the circumstances by a right principle of 
conduct".° However, most of the actions display a moral 
understanding of the agent. Often the agent may desist 
from doing something since it may be considered 
undesirable by him, which may then be a motive for some 
other action. Again conflicts in motives are not a very 
unusual phenomenon and require decision, choice or 
deliberation for resolution. The reason may motivate and, 
surely in this sense, reason may be a motive for action 
involving decision, choice or deliberation. 
Audi argues, "Reason for action-considerations that 
call for or justify action. They may be subjective or 
objective. A subjective reason is a consideration an agent 
understands to support a course of action, regardless of 
whether the agent realizes it. What are cited as reasons 
may be matters either of fact or of value, but when facts 
are cited values are also relevant. Thus the fact that 
cigarette smoke contains nicotine is a reason, for not 
smoking only because nicotine has undesirable effects. 
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The most important evaluative reasons are normative 
reasons - i.e. considerations having (e.g.) ethical force. 
Reasons for action enter practical thinking as the contents 
to beliefs, desires, and other mental states. But not all the 
reasons one has need motivate the corresponding 
behaviours. Thus I may recognize an obligation to pay 
taxes, yet do so only for fear of punishment. If so, then 
only my fear is an explaining reason for my action".^ In this 
case, Baier argues, "...a reason only because it is a reason 
for a particular person when deliberating about a number of 
alternative lines of action open to him".^° 
As Peters points out, "...the directive aspect of the 
term 'motive'-the 'contemplated result or object' or the 
'consideration of reason' which influences volit ion. But it 
also stresses the notion of the 'moving', which is the 
etymological suggestion of the word, and its connexion with 
emotion and desire. And many would suggest that it is this 
connexion with emotion and movement which makes a 
reason a motive. It is an operative reason because of a 
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causal connexion between directedness and some inner 
springs in the individual".^^ Kenny too argues: 
"A doctor may reason out impeccably how to 
cure a patient; he may fail to act on his 
conclusion for a variety of reason (e.g. because 
he is lazy, or avaricious). 
"Thus, the transition from the conclusion to 
the action is more intimately related to the 
nature of ethical reasoning than the execution of 
a technical plan is to the nature of technical 
planning".^^ 
The intimacy is not simply ethical but a motive understood 
as ethical reasoning motivating action. Ethical reasoning 
by itself evolves only principles and not necessarily any 
action, since ethical reasoning may break down in the 
relation of reason and action on count of ' laziness, etc'. 
As presented in chapter third an explanation of action 
requires citing of reasons, which elaborate a discernible 
pattern, may be acceptable to the inquirer. We can suggest 
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that by such explanations or citing of reasons we place 
actions in the widest socio-economic, linguistics or even 
evaluative context, such as ethical situations. However, the 
primary question that has to be answered is whether 
motive, which can be cited as a reason could be a cause of 
action. Melden has argued that a cause must be logically 
separate from the alleged effect but a reason for an action 
is not logically distinct from the action, so reasons are not 
causes of actions. However, Davidson disagree when he 
says that from understanding reasons as explanations or 
descriptions of action and cause and effect as separate it 
cannot be concluded that "...reasons are not causes of 
action".^^ It may be necessary to remind that for our thesis 
we have tried to show that motives are reasons for actions, 
in short we have tried to show that motives and reasons 
are identifiable in relation to actions. 
For Hume the relation of 'cause' to effect is of 
association, where similarity of objects of the first and 
second type is the determining factor. However, this 
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association is not a necessary connection such that if the 
circumstances were to be repeated the same action would 
follow, although depicted as ordinary singular causal 
statements implying generalization. According to Hart and 
Honore, as mentioned by Davidson, Hume is wrong m 
supposing motives and desires as ordinary causes of 
actions. The suggestion by Davidson is that some reasons, 
he calls them primary; are causes of actions in terms of 
causal explanations. He then proceeds to show that this is 
all part of what he calls 'rationalization'. The rationalization 
is explanation of action showing motive/wanting to be the 
cause. Davidson successfully agrees that causal 
explanations are involved in descriptions of actions, 
however, there need not be an involvement of a law like 
generality, for we are here dealing with "rationalizations" 
Davidson agrees, "If the causes of a class of events 
(actions) fall in a certain class (reasons) and there is a law 
to back each singular causal statement, it does not follow 
that there is any law connecting events classified as 
reasons with events classified as action...".^" Hume had 
shown utter disregard for causal connections and 
presented only a relation of conjunction. Feinberg points 
out, "...the constant and regular conjunction of similar 
events...may possibly...[be] universally...[as] a great 
uniformity among the actions of men ...and that human 
nature remains still the same motives always produce the 
same action; the same event follow from the same 
causes".^^ Davidson points out, "A reason rationalizes an 
action only if it leads us to see something the agent saw, 
or thought he saw, in his action - some feature, 
consequence, or aspect of the action the agent wanted, 
desired, prized, held dear, thought dutiful, beneficial, 
obligatory, or agreeable. We cannot explain why someone 
did, what he did simply by saying the particular action 
appealed".^® The appeal may be the factor in choosing or 
deciding leading to an action. The choice may simply be of 
the motive that has come to dominate. Schreier points out, 
"Actions occur only in systems which necessitate evolution 
of alternative paths of actions and commitment to those 
alternatives which has been chosen".^'' 
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However, Baier points out, "We know that a line of 
action is in accordance with reason when it is the 
necessary or best or most efficient means to our ends"/*^ 
Feinberg points out, "All laws being founded on rewards 
and punishment, it is supposed, as a fundamental principle, 
that these motives have a regular and uniform influence on 
the mind and both produce the good and prevent the evil 
actions. We may give to this influence what name we 
please, but as it is usually conjoined with the action, it 
must be esteemed a cause and be looked upon as an 
instance of that necessity which we would here 
establish".^^ In other words, reason may be used in terms 
of motive and motive may be regarded as reason for 
action. 
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